{"id":815,"date":"2015-02-14T11:41:04","date_gmt":"2015-02-14T11:41:04","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/new.lact.ro\/2015\/02\/14\/viorica-ticu-dniester-region-in-the-geostrategy-of-russian-federation\/"},"modified":"2015-02-14T11:41:04","modified_gmt":"2015-02-14T11:41:04","slug":"viorica-ticu-dniester-region-in-the-geostrategy-of-russian-federation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/viorica-ticu-dniester-region-in-the-geostrategy-of-russian-federation\/","title":{"rendered":"Viorica \u021a\u00eecu: DNIESTER REGION IN THE GEOSTRATEGY OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION"},"content":{"rendered":"

Introduction <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

This article represents a geopolitical and geostrategic analysis of the Dniester region, a geopolitical ensemble formed from Republic of Moldova, Transnistria[1]<\/span><\/a> and Ukraine, located between two power centers \u2013 West and Russian Federation. The geographical location and diversified neighborhood highlights the contrast of this space and the tacit competition between East and West, in order to influence it politically, diplomatically and economically. A geopolitical analysis of the region in correlation with Central, South-East and East Europe shows us its geopolitical and geostrategic importance, given that the zone has the role of a ling bridge between them. Thus we can deduce what are the geopolitical and geostrategic interests and principles of the big powers in this region; this fact influences directly the evolution of the internal situation of the region and of the states, which are part of it, also its geopolitical structure and path. The arguments will be presented according to several directions. The first one will describe the geopolitical decryption of the space we mentioned, respectively determining the frameworks of a geopolitical analysis, allowing to understand the evolutions and the dynamics, which marked this space. Then we will pass to the assessment of the region from the perspective of security dimensions, the delimitation of the Dniester zone as security region, pointing out the wide significance the concept got since 1991 and which has to be taken into consideration also in the case of this region. Recently, to these favorable premises concerning the geostrategy and security region joined another one, as important and with a potential that cannot be ignored. We speak here about the geostrategic situation of the Dniester region in the light of the Ukrainian crisis that makes the interest for the Dniester region to increase; plus the necessity of a global strategy becomes more vital. We will review these geopolitical evolutions, which announce significant geostrategic changes with direct impact on the Dniester region.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cNear Abroad\u201d<\/i> \u2013 strategy of the Russian Foreign Policy in post-soviet space<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The dissolution of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the \u201990 and the creation of 15 independent republics in the ex-soviet space generated a series of transformations not only at political and social-economical level, but it determined the adoption of another way of thinking, another set of values, a new conception of the space and their role in the world[2]<\/span><\/a>. Within the newly created conjuncture, the defense of the statehood, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity-claimed by the new independent states from the ex-soviet space, was becoming the expression of a certain political reality, and reflection of the situation and its change according to the national interests and aspirations was the main reasoning of the statehood[3]<\/span><\/a>. The lack of this experience provoked, in the case of post-soviet states, a heavy crisis of political identity, emphasized here and there by the lack of clearly defined security identity. Hence, a part of the ex-soviet states were considering their security assured through the close cooperation with Moscow; others, for example, Baltic states, Georgia or Azerbaijan were declaring openly the integration aspirations to Euro-Atlantic structures.<\/span><\/p>\n

            From another side, the collapse of the Soviet Union didn\u2019t mean only a quantity loss, as it would be a territory, resources, population, but also a quality one, the loss of an imperial identity. The political, historical, cultural and ethnical boundaries, as the mental maps of the Russian lost the coherence. The dismantling of all the Russians, along the centuries, used to consider as reality, as the only possible reality, generated the transformation process of the post-soviet Russia. The need to rethink the historical and geo-cultural basis and the internal preoccupations for the Russia\u2019s transition to democracy were directly linked with the problem of redefining the new doctrinaire-strategic concepts. The projects born from the old geopolitical thinking try to restore the former geopolitical space, and the institutes of strategic studies try to redefine the interests of the Russia in the new geostrategic context, determining the leaders from Kremlin to formulate more geostrategic options, focused on the recovery of the lost territories after the Soviet Union collapse. The major conceptual, mental and material reorganizations of the Russian society had a significant impact on the foreign policy[4]<\/span><\/a>. Taking into consideration the proportions of the historical changes, Russia, through its elite, discovers new geostrategic options, which would enclose its position. Consequently, talking about Russian foreign policy, we can identify in the \u201990 several geopolitical mega-projects, around which the political forces concentrated. In this sense, Near Abroad<\/i> is representative because by this strategy Russia proposed to itself to become the integration and consolidation generator of the new regional system in the ex-soviet space, whose historical, human and economic links according to its opinion, the USSR heir, would justify this project.<\/span><\/p>\n

            The new realities faced by the union ex-republics, supplied by the frustrations of the Russian-speakers population and former communist elite, create a state of uncertainty, economic-political chaos and deep identity crisis. Within the created conjuncture it is launched the concept of Near Abroad<\/i>, strategy that tries to outline the realities of the soviet inheritance for some, and the basis of the neo-imperial aspirations for others. Everything starts with the configuration of the new Russian military doctrine from November 1993[5]<\/span><\/a>. The inspirited of the military doctrine of 1993 was B. Yeltsin, and its main craftsman was the general Pavel Grachev, minister of Defense[6]<\/span><\/a>. The ambiguity and the diversification of interpreting this concept creates the impression of collapsed shadow of the great Soviet Empire, who seems often to not have enough power to persuade in order to maintain viable relations between the former \u201csisters\u201d and \u201cthe big brother\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n

            The extra-territorial feature of rights protection concept of the Russian citizens from outside the Russian Federation borders \u2013 in 1991 almost 25 million Russians were outside the national territory[7]<\/span><\/a>, was striving to legalize the maintenance of the Russian military presence on the territory of the states from Independent States Community; Moscow was insisting to survey the faith of its co-ethnics, and to prevent from any military, political or economic interference from the part of West or other power neighboring with this space. In this context, it is significant the expression \u201cthe republics can be turned away from the Russian Federation, but the Russian Federation cannot be alienated from the republics\u201d.[8]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

            <\/strong>Naturally, this strategy sparked off debates among the political elites, the main objectives were the assessment of the serious causes that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and equally the consequences of this phenomenon on the development vectors of the foreign policy adjusted to the new realities. It was not the question of reviving the empire, this fact would discontent, contrarily it was supposing the creation of a new interaction system, which would maintain the ex-soviet states in the interests\u2019 sphere of Russia and Russia would have the possibility to keep its dominant geopolitical position in this zone. An important role had the debates of geopolitical resonance, published as scientific monographs and studies. In these circumstances, the main geopolitical visions crystallizes, visions that influenced intensively Kremlin\u2019s policies at the beginning of the \u201990, 20th<\/sup> century. Russia\u2019s reaction can be explained, from one hand, by the imperial mentality and nostalgia of political elite and some large categories of population for the former mighty USSR and the desire to return the lost territories; and from other hand \u2013 by the will of Kremlin\u2019s leaders to formulate new solutions that would adjust Russian Federation to the new geopolitical realities through more means, some of them at the limit of the legislation and international customs, but most of them beyond this limit. In the same context, the geopolitical pluralism determined Moscow to rethink its security policy, looking for expressing itself by different formulas spun vertically and horizontally, including constraint formulas of the post-soviet states through the collective security treaty[9]<\/span><\/a>. The principles claimed in the collective security project were presenting Russia as the single country guaranteeing the stability and the prosperity for the satellite countries, setting itself up as the only legal peace-maker country.<\/span><\/p>\n

Dniester region: geographic position, geopolitical importance   <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

First of all, it has to be mentioned that we discuss about a geopolitical space with a geographic artificial position. Such space is Dniester region, Dniester means the region located nearby Dniester[10]<\/span><\/a>. As space, the region is composed of the triangle Republic of Moldova – Transnistria[11]<\/span><\/a> – Ukraine and comprises almost 637 thousand square meters, with a population of almost 52 million habitants, and it has exit to the Black Sea with a length of 1355 km.[12]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

            The current configuration of the Dniester region is the result of the political \u2013 territorial transformations, which took place after the Soviet Union dissolution and the advent of new independent states, in this case Ukraine and Republic of Moldova. The historical construction attests that it is a very old subject, which came back in the last years in the attention of the political environment and media, the neo-imperial concept of Russia in the Dniester region has its origin in the tsarist and soviet eras, and namely after 1792[13]<\/span><\/a> the territorial expansion between Don and Dnieper (Nogai steppe), between Bug and Dniester (Edisan steppe) after 1793. Taking into consideration the geopolitical and geostrategic valences of the zone and following the historical course of the events from the ancient times until now, this special and interested geographic position awoke constantly the interest of Russia, being considered from geostrategic perspective a border space in the \u201cnear abroad\u201d, profiting with any occasion to claim the control and exploitation right of the zone. The Dniester space, which is a Eurasian enclave, had turbulent historical events because of its geographic positions and its geopolitical and geo-economic role.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Post-soviet Russia was deprived by the border of South-East Europe, and the Dniester space occupies a considerable part of the continental shelf of former USSR, and therefore the Dniester space constitutes a center of strategic gravitation. The region, analyzed together with the maritime space from the proximity, distinguishes by the diversity of the states from neighborhood and the geopolitical ensembles they belong.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Simultaneously, these facts estranged Russia from Danube, river that crosses more states from Central and West Europe, Ukraine separated Azov Sea and separating Kerch strait (Cimmerian Bosporous) \u2013 the strait with a geo-economic and geostrategic importance that waits to be discovered[14]<\/span><\/a>. In this context, we can ascertain that the Dniester space, especially Ukraine, constitutes a geopolitical pivot, because its existence and the existence of Republic of Moldova as independent states, contribute to the geopolitical transformation of Russia. Besides the dismissal of 25 million people closed ethnically and religiously to Russians, it had importance also the dominant geostrategic position lost by Russia in the Black Sea, \u201cwhere Odessa was serving as vital gate for the trade with Mediterranean and with the world beyond it\u201d[15]<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

            After 1990, Russia remains with a small costal stretch and with disputes solved partially with Ukraine regarding the right to keep its basis in Crimea for what left from Black Sea navy. The fact that Ukraine and Republic of Moldova declared their independence \u2013 their territories play an extremely important role for the transit of energy resources from East to West, determined the energy equation on the European continent in the period up to USSR implosion to get another form.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Actually, the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the zone is significant thanks to the connection it has with Balkans and Mediterranean zone. As Zb. Brzezinski mentioned, the Soviet Ukraine was representing the European interface of the old empire: \u201cIt cannot be enough highlighted the fact that, without Ukraine, Russia cease to be an empire, but with Russia becomes automatically an empire<\/i>\u201d[16]<\/span><\/a>. Therewith, the geopolitical equation of the Dniester region is the most complex, in comparison with other regions from the ex-soviet space. An argument ascertaining this statement, would be the exit to the Black Sea and the limitation of Russia\u2019s positions in the Pontic area and the existence of almost 11 million Russians that live in this region and the possession of Crimean peninsula. Meanwhile, Ukraine deprived Russia of South-East border of Europe, positioning itself as a partial substitute of Soviet Union; Ukraine separating Russia from Danube, Azov Sea and Bosporus of Crimea, all these facts give it an increased geostrategic value.<\/span><\/p>\n

            From another hand, anyway, this geopolitical ensemble is a shield for Russia against military danger, and a political one from the danger coming from West, especially from the part of NATO. An important thing for Russia would probably represent (regarding its defense against NATO extension toward East) the annexation of Crimea in 2014, which assure its exit to the Black Sea; Russian navy rents additionally in Odessa as result of Russia\u2019s and Ukraine\u2019s agreements and the stationing of the Russian troops in East part of Republic of Moldova, despite the obligations Russia has to respect according to Istanbul summit of 1999.<\/span><\/p>\n

            The diminution of the strategic position in South-West flank by the detachment of Republic of Moldova from Soviet Union, led to major changes in the area of Pontic isthmus. As consequence, it is diminished the Russia\u2019s influence of all it represents Balkans, Central and East Europe. During USSR, Moldova was having a military-strategic importance. Being the South-West border of USSR, Soviet Moldova was playing, within military district of Odessa, the role of main bastion in case of aggression from the South-West part. Plus, the territory of Moldova was as bridgehead for the future offensive operations on the South-West operations theatre in the direction of Balkans, Greece, Turkey with Suez Canal and North Africa coast as secondary strategic objective. The strategic value of Republic of Moldova is still significant and it is determined by the Russian garrison from Tiraspol, where the direct access of Russia is blocked by the Ukraine. Through Transnistria \u2013 through Tiraspol and Bender passes the railway that connects Ukraine with Romania. Tiraspol has a huge strategic significance, becoming the main bridgehead toward South-East Europe. Russia\u2019s presence in Transnistria allows it to exercise pressure on the south flank of Ukraine. Insecurity on Dniester, which separates the districts from the country\u2019s East, means security on Prut, and in the context of Romania\u2019s adherence to Euro-Atlantic structures, Transnistria transformed itself in a \u201cKaliningrad in the region of Black Sea\u201d, in other words \u2013 a Russian enclave that allows to Moscow to destabilize the situation at regional and global level. In this respect, \u201cNezavisimaia Gazeta\u201d, the voice of Federal Security Service was mentioning in August 2000 \u201cMoldova, despite its small dimensions and proper possibilities, will be for Russia one of the key points in ISC<\/i>\u201d[17]<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Therewith, feeling a radical geopolitical limitation, Kremlin\u2019s leaders aspire through different methods to legalize the maintenance of the Russian presence. For Russia, the equation of maintaining its influence in the region, through Tiraspol, depends more than ever of Ukraine. Ukraine remains the most important territorial stake of Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n

The strategic options of Russia in Dniester region<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

The situation\u2019s complexity in the region, as result of the USSR implosion, increased the interest of the international actors for this region. Or, after 1991, this region becomes a space of interests and a competition of two geostrategic positions: the Euro-Atlantic one and the Russian one. As president of the Russian Federation, returning to the traditional \u201cdiplomacy of force\u201d and making use of political-military and economic pressure means, Kremlin promotes more strategies in order to maintain its dominant role in this space[18]<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

            After USSR implosion, Kremlin searched strategies that would assure an honorable retreat, and maintenance of Russian vector in Dniester space. Using economic levers, Russia insisted on the instauration of an autocratic leadership centered on the imposition of its own interests in this region.<\/span><\/p>\n

            The strategic options for Dniester region during \u201990 oscillated from passivity or occasional activism, during the presidency of B. Yeltsin, to organized and aggressive dynamics during V. Putin, his successor D. Medvdev, and recently the return of V. Putin; these ones are divided in more categories. The first one would include the geo-historical, geo-ethnical and geo-cultural strategies, the second \u2013 the geopolitical and geostrategic strategies, the third \u2013 the geo-economic and geo-energetic strategies. Referring to history, ethnicity and culture, we have to start from the fact that Russia\u2019s statehood starts once with the creation of Kyiv Russia. Without Ukraine[19]<\/span><\/a>, Russia\u2019s history loses historical beginnings and perspectives, but the return under Russian influence sphere of this territory will create safekeeping and consolidation conditions of Russian statehood from the historiographical point of view. Although, we have to remark that Russia, according to its nature and historical traditions, was a continental empire that was gathering different nations according to the principle of civilizational identity.<\/span><\/p>\n

So, a separation of this space from the influence sphere of Moscow will call into question the existence of Russia as an empire, fact that can have a negative impact on its territorial integrity in the present. The importance of the Kyiv in the context of oriental Slav civilization represents the swing of the Russian orthodox Christianity and the main link in the post-byzantine civilizational space. Therewith, Russia\u2019s interest for Ukraine and for Moldova enters the context of keeping the confessional unity of the Russian Orthodox Church. A definitive separation between the Orthodox Church from Kyiv and the one from Chisinau of the one from Moscow will threaten historically the authority of the Russian Church, as result we can assist at degradation of the post-byzantine civilizational space and of the spiritual cohabitation of the Russian people.<\/span><\/p>\n

From geopolitical and geostrategic point of view, the interest of Russian Federation for Dniester region consists in its access to the Black Sea and to the Bosporus and Dardanelle straits, Balkans and then to the Mediterranean Sea, the Near East and the World Ocean through the South direction. The return of the Moldavian-Ukrainian region under the Russian influence will remove from the political and diplomatic agenda the question regarding the East Europe, fact that would return to Russia the status of global power. Not accidentally, Dniester region represents for Russia the shield against the danger extension coming from NATO, which is seen by Moscow as a threaten for its security and territorial integrity.<\/span><\/p>\n

In this context, thanks to its geographical position, we can see the geostrategic value of Crimean peninsula. On latitudinal direction, Crimea assures the access and the control in Balkans and Caucasus, and if it is necessary, there is enough potential to close the \u201cinstability axis\u201d[20]<\/span><\/a>, which stretches from Adriatic until Xinjiang. On the meridional direction, Crimea allows the extension from North toward Southern direction until Near East or its blockage by creating a danger in the center of East Europe. Crimea gets a territorial facet with a double significance: either connecting states and cultures, or separating them.<\/span><\/p>\n

Odessa and Giurgiulesti are other two strategic points in the geopolitical equation of Moldovan-Ukrainian zone, their importance being bi-dimensional: maritime and continental. Developed auto routes network, position of Odessa nearby Danube, Dniester, South Bug and Dnepr, the big harbors of Odessa, Iliciovsk and Iujn\u00eei, the international airport of Odessa and the railways that cross this region create favorable and unique conditions for transporting and transiting the goods from different parts of the Euro-Asian continent[21]<\/span><\/a>. Giurgiulesti, situated in the South part of Republic of Moldova, through the International Free Harbor, assures the only exit to Danube.<\/span><\/p>\n

            Geo-economic and geo-energetic options of Russia for Dniester space represents necessity, because this space has an important position regarding the natural resources transit[22]<\/span><\/a>. This space inherited the wide gas pipelines network, built in the Soviet Union. This fact determines that this region play a very important role in the continental energetic field. In this case we can remark the most important transit ways of the Russian energetic resources toward West Europe; thanks to them Russia gets huge incomes that influences a lot the internal economic situation of the country.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, we can ascertain that the geopolitical interest of Russia in this region is part of the strategy of regaining its former influence on the European continent. Republic of Moldova inherited legally the entire transport, transit and distribution system of the natural gas, located on its territory. In 1992, after Transnistrian conflict, when Chisinau was losing its control on the territory from the left side of Dniester River, a part of this patrimony passes under the administrative control of the separatist authorities, assisted politically and financially by the Russian Federation. We have to ascertain that at the moment Republic of Moldova cannot assure completely its energetic security, because the natural gas is imported 100% from a single source \u2013 Russian Federation; this fact determines the authorities from Chisinau to have limited possibilities when they negotiate the import price of the energetic resource.<\/span><\/p>\n

Ukraine, its geographic position and gas pipelines network \u2013 built in Soviet Union, determined that this state play a very important role in the continental energetic field. This can be explained by the fact that across Ukrainian territory transits almost 80% of natural gas resources, imported from Russia to EU, this represents 25%[23]<\/span><\/a> from the total imported volume by the states-communities. When the Ukrainian crisis started, the 21st<\/sup> of November 2013, the government from Kiev made a public statement, announcing that it will suspend the negotiation for signing the Association Agreement to European Union. Immediately after the political regime from Kiev changed, a series of events took place that led to the annexation of Crimea to Russian Federation and to the tension of the geopolitical environment in this region[24]<\/span><\/a>. EU and USA imposed to Russia a series of economic sanctions and their impact on the Russian economic evolution cannot be ignored. Ultimately, we aim to analyze a possible evolution of Russia\u2019s economy during post-sanctions period, highlighting the consequences concerning the economic security and geopolitical stability.<\/span><\/p>\n

Starting from the new geopolitical realities, Russian foreign policy registered a series of fundamental modifications. The combination of the geopolitical and geo-economic factors in the Russian diplomacy led an approach called by the analysts \u201cneo-realism\u201d. This neo-realism implies the recognition of the Russia\u2019s weak condition at the beginning of the century, condition that prevents the influence capacity of Russia in the international policy[25]<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

In real terms, this pragmatism means auto-restriction and concentration on resources. In other words, \u201cthe new realism\u201d of Russia is a diversification of the foreign policy tools and their efficient application in order to realize the current ambitions. Acceptation of this concept led to considerable changes in the decision-making process concerning the foreign policy of Moscow. Meanwhile, the preoccupation for the economic growth of Russia led to the consolidation of the economic aspects of the country\u2019s foreign policy.<\/span><\/p>\n

The leader from Kremlin, V. Putin ant his normative view have a central role in defining and assuming the new \u201cstrategic identity\u201d. It can be resumed through the recover vectors of the embezzled magnificence of \u201cthe biggest catastrophe of the 20th<\/sup> century\u201d, which was quantified by Putin in the USSR collapse, maintain of the strategic independence on the international scene and implementation of the \u201csovereign democracy\u201d concepts in the interior and the \u201cbig sovereign power\u201d in the exterior. To this effect, president Putin and his team started processes, aiming first of all, the monopolization of decision-making process of the foreign policy and the accentuation of geo-economic components in the relations with the states of ex-soviet space.<\/span><\/p>\n

The realistic approach of the current administration is contemplated also in the growth of economic component in the foreign policy of Russia for Dniester region. Controlling the natural resources, the government from Moscow gave priority to energetic field in its foreign policy agenda. The strategic resources constituted the guarantee of the economic modernization and a tool with which Russia can impose itself in the post-soviet space. As an energetic supplier of the region, Moscow deepened the ex-union states\u2019 dependence, which vulnerability can be transformed in a political ascendency.<\/span><\/p>\n

It is sure that currently, Russian federation geostrategy has a certain mix of missionary outreaches, anchored in the defense of Russian ethnics and vital neo-imperial intentions in order to maintain the influence of the Russian state in Dniester region. The Russian strategy is marked by two contradictory tendencies; from one hand it is encouraged the development of confidence atmosphere by the organization\u2019s training, schemes of regional cooperation, joint action of security preservation against so-called \u201cnew risks\u201d; and from other hand it uses its military force in frozen conflicts or aiming to discourage when Moscow ascertains that the orientation of some riverside states take a \u201cdangerous\u201d turn, an integration within Euro-Atlantic structures. The statements such as \u201cthe basins of the Black Sea and Azov Sea are located in the Russian zone of strategic interest\u201d or \u201cthe Black Sea offers Russia a dicer access to the most important global transport routes\u201d only highlight the fact that Russia does not want to abandon its position in the near neighborhood.         <\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

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[1]<\/span><\/span><\/a> \u201cTransdnestria\u201d and \u201cTransnistria\u201d are considered synonymous and equally accurate even if they refer to different languages to call the river Dniester (Russian) or Nistru (Romanian). In this article, I chose to use \u201cTransnistria\u201d. Though pro-Moldovan, \u201cTransnistria\u201d is the most widespread denomination among English-speaking scholars (albeit the OSCE refers to it as \u201cTransdnestria\u201d and if Tiraspol’s authorities prefer using directly the Russian name \u201cPridnestrovie\u201d).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[2]<\/span><\/a> A. N. Bykov, Postsovetskoye prostranstvo. Strategii integratsii i novyye vyzovy globalizatsii<\/i>.<\/span> (Post-Soviet<\/i><\/span> space<\/span>. Integration strategy<\/span> and the new<\/span> challenges<\/span> of globalization<\/span><\/i>), Aleteia, Sankt-Petersburg, 2009, p. 16<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[3]<\/span><\/a> Pierre Verluise, Dup\u0103 dou\u0103zeci de ani de la c\u0103derea zidului: Europa reconfigurat\u0103<\/i>, Editura Cartier, Chi\u015fin\u0103u, 2009, p. 39<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[4]<\/span><\/a> Emil’ Pain, Rossiya mezhdu imperiyey i natsiyey. Kontseptsii natsional’no-gosudarstvennogo ustroystva v usloviyakh krizisa grazhdanskoy identichnosti<\/i><\/span> (Emil<\/span>Pain, <\/span>Russia between the empire and nation: The concept of the nation-state devices in a crisis of civic identity<\/i>),<\/span> at \u201ePro et Contra\u201d, Vol. 11, No. 3, Moscova, 2007, p. 45<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[5]<\/span><\/a> The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 2 November 1993 No. 1833 \u201cOn Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation\u201d<\/i>, pe: <\/span>www.lawmix.ru\/expertlaw\/259598\/<\/span><\/cite><\/i><\/span>(10.08.2014)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[6]<\/span><\/a> Adrian Cioroianu, Geopolitica Matrio\u015fc\u0103i: Rusia postsovietic\u0103 \u00een noua ordine mondial\u0103,  <\/i>V. I, Curtea Veche Publishing, Bucure\u015fti, 2009, p. 155.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[7]<\/span><\/a> Sven Gunar Simonsen, Compatriot Games: Explaining the Diaspora linkage in Russia\u2019s Military Withdra wal from the Baltic States<\/i>, at \u201eEurope-Asia Studies\u201d, V. 53, nr. 5, 2001, p. 773-774.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[8]<\/span><\/a> B. Porter, K. Seyvits, Imperiya bylaya i budushchaya: Rossiya i \u201eblizhneye zarubezh’ye<\/i>\u201d.<\/span> (Porter B.<\/span>, <\/span>K. R. Seyvits, <\/span>Former and future the empire: Russia and the “near abroad\u201d<\/span><\/i>), at \u201eMirovaya ekonomika i mejdunarodnie otnosheniya\u201d,<\/em> No. 7, 1995, Moscova, p. 85<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[9]<\/span><\/a> Stanislav Secrieru, Dup\u0103 Imperiu: politica extern\u0103 rus\u0103 (1991-1999)<\/i>, at \u201eMonitor Strategic\u201d, No. 1-2, Bucure\u015fti, 2005, p. 57.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[10]<\/span><\/a> Dniester is the river that runs from Ukraine nearby the border with Poland and it flows in the Black Sea. It marks for a short portion the boundaries between Ukraine and Republic of Moldova. On the left bank of the river is located the separatist region Transnistria, and then the river becomes again border between Moldova and Ukraine, before crossing Ukrainian territories. It runs through Dniester estuary on the Ukrainian territory.  <\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[11]<\/span><\/span><\/a> A self-proclaimed Moldavian Transnistrian Republic (Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika – PMR in Russian) was established in late 1990 and a short conflict opposed secessionist forces to Moldovan troops in spring 1992. The territory of the Transdniester Moldovan Republic extends along the east bank of the Dniester: the length of this narrow band is approximately 200 km, with an average width of only 20 km.  <\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[12]<\/span><\/a> Oleg Serebrian, Va exploda Estul. Geopolitica spa\u0163iului pontic<\/i>, Editura Cartier, Chi\u015fin\u0103u, 2006, p. 13<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[13]<\/span><\/a> According to the terms of the Iasi peace treaty between Russia and Turkey in 1792, the Ottoman Empire agreed to cede control to Russia over the steppes lying between the Bug and the Dniester. The ensuing war between Turkey and Russia (concluded by the treaty of 1812) additionally gave Russia control of Bessarabia (the areas between the Dniester and the Prut, up to the delta of the Danube).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[14]<\/span><\/a> Oleg Serebrian, Op. cit<\/i>., p. 17<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[15]<\/span><\/a> Vladimir Dergachev, Geopoliticheskaya transformatsiya Ukrainskogo Prichernomor’ya<\/i>.<\/span> (Vladimir Dergachev Geopolitical transformation of Ukrainian  Black Sea coast<\/i>), Kiev, 2008, at dergachev.ru\/book-17\/06-2.html <\/span><\/cite>(10.08.2014)<\/span><\/i><\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[16]<\/span><\/span><\/a> Zbigniew Brzezinski, Marea tabl\u0103 de \u015fah: Suprema\u0163ia american\u0103 \u015fi imperativele sale geostrategice<\/i>, Univers Enciclopedic, Bucure\u015fti, 2000, pp. 121-123<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[17]<\/span><\/a> Mihai Gribincea, Politica rus\u0103 a bazelor militare: Moldova \u015fi Georgia<\/i>, Editura Civitas, Chi\u015fin\u0103u, 1999, p. 23<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[18]<\/span><\/a> Adrian Cioroianu, Geopolitica Matrio\u015fc\u0103i: Rusia postsovietic\u0103 \u00een noua ordine mondial\u0103,  <\/i>V. I, Curtea Veche Publishing, Bucure\u015fti, 2009, pp. 139-140.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[19]<\/span><\/span><\/a> A. Dergachev, Ukraina v sovremennykh geopoliticheskikh preobrazovaniyakh.<\/i><\/span> (A. Dergachev, Ukraine in modern geopolitical transformations<\/i>), \u00een \u201ePolis. Politicheskiye issledovaniya\u201d<\/span>, No. 3, 1998, p. 124<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[20]<\/span><\/a> Ibidem<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[21]<\/span><\/a> Vladimir Dergachev, Geopoliticheskaya transformatsiya Ukrainskogo Prichernomor’ya, <\/i>Nauchnyye trudy v semi knigakh, Kn. 7,<\/span> (Vl. Dergachev, Geopolitical transformation of Ukrainian  Black Sea coast. <\/i>Scientific papers in seven books), Kiev, 2008, at <\/i>dergachev.ru\/book-17\/06-2.html <\/span><\/cite>(10.08.2014)<\/span><\/i><\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[22]<\/span><\/a> Vladimir Dergachev, Geopoliticheskaya i geoekonomicheskaya transformatsiya Ukrainy<\/i>.<\/span><\/span>
Nauchnyye trudy v semi knigakh. Kn. 6.,<\/span> (Vl. Dergachev, Geopolitical and geo-economic transformation of Ukraine<\/i>. Scientific papers in seven books), Kiev, 2008, at  http:\/\/dergachev.ru\/book-16\/index.html<\/span><\/a> (10.08.2014)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[23]<\/span><\/a> Ibidem<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[24]<\/span><\/a> Vladimir Dergachev, Geopoliticheskiy separatizm na Ukraine<\/i><\/span> (Geopolitical separatism in Ukraine<\/i>), Kiev, 2014,   at http:\/\/dergachev.ru\/geop_events\/121114-03.html#.VH0HhNpxlVc<\/span><\/a> (10.08.2014)<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n

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[25]<\/span><\/a> Dumitru M\u00eenz\u0103rari, Politica extern\u0103 a Federa\u0163iei Ruse ca obstacol al dezvolt\u0103rii democratice \u00een spa\u0163iul post-sovietic<\/i>, Serie de dezbateri publice na\u0163ionale, No. 5, martie-mai, IDIS \u201cViitorul\u201d, Chi\u015fin\u0103u, 2009, p. 33.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction This article represents a geopolitical and geostrategic analysis of the Dniester region, a geopolitical ensemble formed from Republic of Moldova, Transnistria[1] and Ukraine, located between two power centers \u2013 West and Russian Federation. The geographical location and diversified neighborhood highlights the contrast of this space and the tacit competition between East and West, in…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[7],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/815"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=815"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/815\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=815"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=815"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=815"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}