Evenimentele din Europa de Sud \u2013 Est din ultimii ani demonstreaz\u0103 c\u0103 mediul de securitate interna\u021bional devine tot mai complex. Prin urmare, observ\u0103m o continu\u0103 transformare a caracteristicilor securit\u0103\u021bii \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103, cu influen\u021be de tip politic, militar, economic, cibernetic \u0219i socio-cultural. \u00cen mod direct \u0219i indirect apar disensiuni \u00eentre actorii statali participan\u021bi la procesul de reglementare a conflictului transnistrean. Conflictul din Ucraina, \u00een acest context, joac\u0103 un rol important, pentru c\u0103 genereaz\u0103 noi riscuri \u0219i amenin\u021b\u0103ri la adresa securit\u0103\u021bii \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103 \u0219i \u00een spa\u021biul bazinului M\u0103rii Negre – care face parte din zona de interes pentru mai mul\u021bi actori regionali \u0219i interna\u021bionali.<\/p>\n
\u00cen ultima perioad\u0103 s-au intensificat exerci\u021biile militare ale trupelor ruse\u0219ti din regiunea transnistrean\u0103, numite Grupul Operativ al Trupelor Ruse.[1]<\/a> Potrivit Strategiei Na\u021bionale de Ap\u0103rare a Republicii Moldova pentru anii 2018 \u2013 2021, poten\u021bialul militar din regiunea transnistrean\u0103 a Republicii Moldova (for\u021bele militare sub autoritatea Tiraspolului) \u0219i GOTR reprezint\u0103 o amenin\u021bare la adresa securit\u0103\u021bii R. Moldova \u0219i submineaz\u0103 integritatea teritorial\u0103 a \u021b\u0103rii (Punctul 13 \u0219i 14 din Strategie<\/em>)[2]<\/a>. Potrivit Cur\u021bii Constitu\u021bionale a R. Moldova, contingentul militar al Federa\u021biei Ruse sta\u021bioneaz\u0103 pe teritoriul R. Moldova contrar prevederilor constitu\u021bionale.[3]<\/a> Mai mult de at\u00e2t, la data de 22 iunie 2018, Adunarea General\u0103 a ONU – la sesiunea Nr. 72 – a adoptat Rezolu\u021bia cu privire la retragerea complet\u0103 a trupelor militare str\u0103ine de pe teritoriul R. Moldova (Documentul A\/RES\/72\/282<\/em>)[4]<\/a>. Federa\u021bia Rus\u0103 comenteaz\u0103 aceste m\u0103suri drept contraproductive \u0219i de provoca\u021bie, care vor destabiliza procesul de negocieri.[5]<\/a> Drept consecin\u021b\u0103 putem observa reac\u021bia F. Ruse \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103, prin exerci\u021biile militare ale solda\u021bilor ru\u0219i \u00een comun cu for\u021bele militare de la Tiraspol. F. Rus\u0103 afirm\u0103 c\u0103 aceste exerci\u021bii militare au scop de defensiv\u0103, pe c\u00e2nd Chi\u0219in\u0103ul, Kievul \u0219i Occidentul le calific\u0103 cu scop de ofensiv\u0103.<\/p>\n Trebuie de remarcat faptul c\u0103 problema sta\u021bion\u0103rii trupelor ruse\u0219ti \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103 are un specific. Acesta const\u0103 \u00een asigurarea securit\u0103\u021bii depozitelor militare din apropierea comunei Cobasna din raionul R\u00e2bni\u021ba. \u00cen timpul URSS, depozitul de la Cobasna, numit Depozitul 1411 de Artilerie<\/em> (parte din Districtul Militar Odesa) avea o importan\u021b\u0103 strategic\u0103 pentru arsenalul militar al Districtului de Vest, iar \u00een anul 1990\u00a0 aici au fost retrase muni\u021biile militare de pe teritoriul Ungariei, Cehoslovaciei \u0219i RDG. O parte din echipamentele militare au fost transportate spre F. Rus\u0103 prin teritoriul Ucrainei, \u00eens\u0103 o parte de echipamente se afl\u0103 p\u00e2n\u0103 \u00een prezent \u00een depozit. Transportarea acestor muni\u021bii\u00a0 \u00een F. Rus\u0103 r\u0103m\u00e2ne a fi o mare problem\u0103 a procesului de negocieri, mai ales dup\u0103 \u00eentreruperea rela\u021biilor militare \u00eentre Ucraina \u0219i F. Rus\u0103.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00cen sistemul actual al rela\u021biilor interna\u021bionale este imposibil de a discuta despre stabilitate \u0219i siguran\u021b\u0103 \u00een anumite regiuni ale lumii \u00een izolare fa\u021b\u0103 de anumite procese care au loc la nivel global. Analiz\u00e2nd evenimentele din arealul bazinului M\u0103rii Negre dar \u0219i procesele din diploma\u021bia interna\u021bional\u0103 putem trage anumite concluzii referitor la ceea ce se \u00eent\u00e2mpl\u0103 din punct de vedere militar \u0219i politic \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103.<\/p>\n Dup\u0103 cum apreciaz\u0103 \u0219i Strategia Na\u021bional\u0103 de Ap\u0103rare a R. Moldova 2018 \u2013 2021, deteriorarea rela\u021biilor \u00eentre F. Rus\u0103 \u0219i Occident genereaz\u0103 proliferarea noilor amenin\u021b\u0103ri \u00een regiune (vezi punctul 29 din Strategie<\/em>).[7]<\/a> \u00cen ultima perioad\u0103 s-au intensificat exerci\u021biile militare ale F. Ruse \u00een Districtul Militar de Sud, care este cel mai aproape de regiunea transnistrean\u0103. Nava militar\u0103 rus\u0103 \u00ab\u0421\u043c\u0435\u0442\u043b\u0438\u0432\u044b\u0439\u00bb se \u00eentoarce \u00een Sevastopol dup\u0103 o misiune din Marea Mediteran\u0103, au loc exerci\u021bii militare cu sistemele de rachete S-400 \u201eTriumph\u201d (cod NATO \u2013 SA-21 Growler<\/em>) \u0219i Pantsir S-1 (cod NATO \u2013 SA-22 Greyhound<\/em>), \u00een Armenia, Abhazia, Osetia de Sud au loc exerci\u021bii militare cu trupe terestre, aeriene \u0219i navale.[8]<\/a> Pe fundalul acestor ac\u021biuni, Grupul Operativ de Trupe Ruse din regiunea transnistrean\u0103, care face parte din Districtul Militar de Vest, a desf\u0103\u0219urat exerci\u021bii militare \u00een apropriere de grani\u021ba cu Ucraina. Ambasada Ucrainei din R. Moldova a emis un comunicat de pres\u0103 prin care afirm\u0103 c\u0103 este \u00eengrijorat\u0103 de aceste exerci\u021bii militare ale trupelor ruse\u0219ti \u0219i c\u0103 F. Rus\u0103 \u00eencalc\u0103 regimul Zonei de Securitate.[9]<\/a>\u00a0 Pe de alt\u0103 parte, \u00een luna iulie, Ucraina al\u0103turi de SUA \u0219i alte 19 state a participat la opera\u021biunea militar\u0103 din Marea Neagr\u0103 \u201eSea Breeze\u201d. Exerci\u021biile militare au avut loc \u00een partea de nord-vest a M\u0103rii Negre \u0219i au cuprins \u00eentreaga regiune Odesa, care se \u00eenvecineaz\u0103 cu regiunea transnistrean\u0103. Mai mult de at\u00e2t, \u00een data de 12 august 2018 distrug\u0103torul american USS Carney DDG-64, a intrat \u00een Marea Neagr\u0103.[10]<\/a><\/p>\n Este posibil ca aceste ac\u021biuni s\u0103 fi produs o reac\u021bie de contram\u0103suri din partea F. Ruse. Au avut loc concomitent mai multe exerci\u021bii militare din zona bazinului M\u0103rii Negre, printre care \u0219i exerci\u021biile GOTR.\u00a0 Dac\u0103 vom analiza manevra tactic\u0103 a navelor maritime din Marea Neagr\u0103, din partea SUA particip\u00e2nd distrug\u0103torul USS Carney, iar din partea F. Ruse nava de patrulare\u00a0 \u00ab\u0421\u043c\u0435\u0442\u043b\u0438\u0432\u044b\u0439\u00bb atunci putem concluziona c\u0103 SUA este \u00een ofensiv\u0103, iar F. Rus\u0103 \u00een defensiv\u0103. Chiar \u0219i caracteristicile de \u00eenarmare denot\u0103 acest lucru. Nava rus\u0103 este dotat\u0103 cu 2X4 lansatoare de rachete X-35 anti-nav\u0103 \u201eUran\u201d, 12 tunuri de artilerie de 76 mm. de tip AK-726, complex anti-rachet\u0103 \u201eVolna\u201d (16 rachete), 5 torpile \u0219i sistemul RBU-1000 anti-torpil\u0103 \u0219i anti-submarin.[11]<\/a> Pe c\u00e2nd nava SUA este dotat\u0103 cu sistemul antirachet\u0103 \u201eAegis\u201d, la bord are\u00a0 2 sisteme de rachete VLS capabile s\u0103 foloseasc\u0103 56 de rachete \u201eTomahawk\u201d, are echipament nuclear \u0219i elicopter de tip SH-60 \u201eSeahawk\u201d.[12]<\/a> Potrivit comandamentului Flotei a 6-a SUA, nava Carney are misiune de securitate \u00een regiune \u0219i colaborare cu partenerii, \u00een special Ucraina, iar \u00een ianuarie 2018 acesta a acostat \u00een portul din Odesa.<\/p>\n Ucraina este un partener strategic important pentru R. Moldova \u00een reglementarea conflictului din regiunea transnistrean\u0103. \u00cens\u0103, prin extinderea \u0219i cooperarea tot mai profund\u0103 cu statele occidentale, sunt exercitate tot mai mari presiuni asupra zonei de conflict Donbas \u0219i apar noi riscuri asupra securit\u0103\u021bii \u00een Transnistria, indicatorii fiind exerci\u021biile militare ale GOTR \u0219i incidentele din Zona de Securitate.<\/p>\n P\u00e2n\u0103 \u00een anul 2014, Ucraina a fost pentru Tiraspol important\u0103 din punct de vedere economic, politic \u0219i logistic. Kievul \u00eendeplinea o func\u021bie de stat patron pentru Transnistria. \u00cens\u0103, odat\u0103 cu criza din Donbas, Transnistria a \u00eenceput s\u0103 fie perceput\u0103 de Kiev ca un posibil \u201ecap de pod pentru agresiunea rus\u0103\u201d.[13]<\/a><\/p>\n Din punct de vedere geostrategic, regiunea transnistrean\u0103 are o mare importan\u021b\u0103 militar\u0103 pentru F. Rus\u0103. Astfel, Kremlinul folose\u0219te GOTR prin prisma a dou\u0103 perspective. Prima se concretizeaz\u0103 \u00eentr-un mecanism de pacificare, iar a doua apare ca un instrument de men\u021binere a intereselor na\u021bionale \u00een regiune. Al doilea interes pare mult mai important pentru F. Rus\u0103, mai ales \u00een contextul actual al abord\u0103rii geopolitice a conflictului transnistrean. Prezen\u021ba militar\u0103 tot mai vizibil\u0103 a Occidentului \u00een\u00a0 apropiere de regiunea transnistrean\u0103 este perceput\u0103 de c\u0103tre Moscova drept o amenin\u021bare strategic\u0103. Cu privire la etapa actual\u0103 a procesului de reglementare a conflictului transnistrean, F. Rus\u0103 consider\u0103 c\u0103 \u00een privin\u021ba anumitor probleme s-a ajuns la un consens. Nimeni din formatul \u201e5+2\u201d nu contest\u0103 ideea c\u0103 posibila solu\u021bie la conflictul transnistrean poate fi un compromis atins prin mijloace pa\u0219nice la masa de negocieri. Acest lucru \u00eenseamn\u0103 g\u0103sirea unei solu\u021bii \u00een care toate p\u0103r\u021bile \u00ee\u0219i vor abandona la maxim interesele lor \u0219i vor dezvolta un model viabil pentru co-existen\u021ba Chi\u0219in\u0103ului \u0219i Tiraspolului. \u00cens\u0103 problema evacu\u0103rii trupelor ruse din regiunea transnistrean\u0103 \u0219i toate evenimentele ce au loc \u00eemprejurul GOTR destabilizeaz\u0103 procesul de negociere \u0219i creeaz\u0103 un mediu de suspiciune. Cu privire la aceast\u0103 problem\u0103, ministrul de externe al F. Ruse, S. Lavrov consider\u0103 c\u0103 \u201enu este nevoie de anticipat un r\u0103zboi\u2026 este o linie de constr\u00e2ngere a F. Ruse\u201d<\/em>.[14]<\/a> Astfel, putem afirma c\u0103 Kremlinul abordeaz\u0103 GOTR din regiunea transnistrean\u0103 \u00eentr-o perspectiv\u0103 de ap\u0103rare regional\u0103.<\/p>\n GOTR \u00eensemneaz\u0103 un efectiv militar de 1000 \u2013 1500 militari, care sunt inclu\u0219i \u00een componen\u021ba for\u021belor de men\u021binere a p\u0103cii \u0219i \u00een asigurarea securit\u0103\u021bii la depozitul militar de la Cobasna, unde sunt p\u0103strate mai mult de 20.000 tone de muni\u021bie. Din anul 2010 GOTR face parte din comandamentul Districtului Militar de Vest.[15]<\/a> Acest district este \u00eenarmat 45% cu echipament \u0219i tehnic\u0103 militar\u0103 de genera\u021bia nou\u0103. \u00cen 2017 a fost \u00eenzestrat cu 1000 de vehicule blindate specializate noi (de cercetare, comunica\u021bie \u0219i logistic\u0103) pe l\u00e2ng\u0103 cele existente. Au fost introduse complexele de rachete 9K51M \u201eTornado G\u201d, \u201eTor-M2\u201d, complexele de radioloca\u021bie \u201eBorisoglebsk-2\u201d, blindate \u201eTaifun-K\u201d \u0219i 82A. Districtul de Vest a fost \u00eenarmat cu noi vehicule chimice de cercetare blindate \u201eRHM-6\u201d \u0219i cu tancuri modernizate de tip T-72BZ cu calibru de 125 mm. For\u021bele aeriene au fost re\u00eennoite cu\u00a0 avioanele de lupt\u0103 multirol Su-35 (cod NATO \u2013 Flanker E+) <\/em>\u0219i Su-35SM, bombardiere avansate cu dubl\u0103 comand\u0103 Su-34 (cod NATO – Fullback)<\/em> \u0219i elicoptere de recunoa\u0219tere \u0219i atac Ka-52 \u201eAlligator\u201d (cod NATO \u2013 Hokum B<\/em>), Mi-28UB (cod NATO – Havoc<\/em>) \u0219i Ka-27 (cod NATO – Helix<\/em>).[16]<\/a> Din cadrul structurii Districtului Militar de Vest\u00a0 face parte Armata a 20-a de Gard\u0103, care cuprinde cele mai mari for\u021be militare din F. Rus\u0103[17]<\/a>, iar 40% din totalul for\u021belor armate ale F. Ruse sunt situate \u00een acest district.<\/p>\n \u00cen condi\u021biile actuale de tensiune a mediului de securitate interna\u021bional, GOTR reprezint\u0103 o for\u021b\u0103 militar\u0103 destul de important\u0103 pentru Districtul Militar de Vest a F. Ruse \u00een regiune. Din decembrie 2016 trupele ruse din Transnistria au ob\u021binut armament modern. Acest armament a ajuns \u00een Transnistria \u00een ciuda faptului c\u0103 Ucraina a interzis tranzitul militar pe teritoriul s\u0103u.[18]<\/a>\u00a0 GOTR include 2 batalioane motorizate de infanterie, batalionul 82 \u0219i 113 dislocate \u00een Tiraspol, precum \u0219i o serie de alte unit\u0103\u021bi \u0219i subunit\u0103\u021bi. Este \u00eenzestrat cu aproximativ 150 de vehicule blindate, precum \u0219i un num\u0103r semnificativ de vehicule de lupt\u0103. GOTR este dotat cu complexe antiaeriene 9K35 \u201eStrela-10\u201d (cod NATO SA-Gropher<\/em>),\u00a0 9K33 \u201eOsa\u201d (cod NATO \u2013 SA-8 Gecko<\/em>), tancuri T-64 \u0219i artilerie de calibru mare. \u00cen departamentul de depozitare a echipamentului militar \u0219i a propriet\u0103\u021bii aerodromului din Tiraspol, se afl\u0103 2 elicoptere de atac Mi-24 P (cod NATO – Hind), <\/em>2 elicoptere Mi-24 K (cod NATO \u2013 Super Hind Mk. IV)<\/em>, \u0219i 4 elicoptere multifunc\u021bionale Mi-8 MT (cod NATO – Hip).<\/em>[19]<\/a> Mai mult de at\u00e2t, din decembrie 2017 GOTR \u00eendepline\u0219te ordinul Comandamentului Districtului Militar de Vest, cu privire la organizarea unor activit\u0103\u021bi de formare militar\u0103 \u0219i patriotic\u0103 a cet\u0103\u021benilor.[20]<\/a><\/p>\n Putem concluziona c\u0103 trupele militare ruse din regiunea transnistrean\u0103 reprezint\u0103 o unitate militar\u0103 bine dotat\u0103 \u0219i preg\u0103tit\u0103 at\u00e2t pentru ofensiv\u0103 c\u00e2t \u0219i pentru defensiv\u0103, care poate fi folosit\u0103 geostrategic \u00een bazinul M\u0103rii Negre. \u00cen contextul actual al situa\u021biei din Ucraina, Kievul vede \u00een GOTR drept o amenin\u021bare pentru securitatea sa. Noua Strategie Na\u021bional\u0103 de Ap\u0103rare a R. Moldova, de asemenea calific\u0103 prezen\u021ba GOTR \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103 drept un risc la adresa securit\u0103\u021bii na\u021bionale. Astfel, GOTR reprezint\u0103 unul dintre factorii importan\u021bi, care al\u0103turi de aplica\u021biile politice a R. Moldova \u0219i Ucrainei creeaz\u0103 contexte \u0219i pretexte pentru o confruntare regional\u0103.<\/p>\n Consider c\u0103 accentul pe problema trupelor ruse din regiunea transnistrean\u0103 a fost reactualizat \u00een baza complexului de probleme de securitate din zona bazinului M\u0103rii Negre. Conflictul transnistrean poate deveni unul din factorii destabilizatori ai zonei. Acest lucru impune analiza situa\u021biei \u0219i luarea \u00een considerare a mai multor activit\u0103\u021bi militare a actorilor cu interese \u00een zon\u0103: F. Rus\u0103, Ucraina, R. Moldova, SUA. Astfel, asigurarea securit\u0103\u021bii \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103 depinde foarte mult de colaborarea militaro-politic\u0103 \u00eentre actorii regionali \u0219i de reglementarea politico-juridic\u0103 \u00eentre P\u0103r\u021bi (Chi\u0219in\u0103u \u0219i Tiraspol).<\/p>\n La momentul de fa\u021b\u0103, lu\u00e2nd \u00een considerare complexitatea circumstan\u021belor militare din regiunea transnistrean\u0103, dar \u0219i \u00een general din zona bazinului M\u0103rii Negre, solu\u021bionarea problemei disloc\u0103rii GOTR nu este posibil\u0103. Cu excep\u021bia cazului \u00een care va exista o schimbare vizibil\u0103 \u00een direc\u021bia colabor\u0103rii militare \u00eentre actorii interna\u021bionali cu interese \u00een regiune. La r\u00e2ndul lor eforturile unilaterale ale F. Ruse \u0219i a altor actori regionali, pu\u021bin probabil c\u0103 deschid o cale spre solu\u021bionarea problemei disloc\u0103rii trupelor ruse \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103, dar \u0219i a altor probleme de securitate. Din aceast\u0103 perspectiv\u0103 conflictul transnistrean este blocat la momentul de fa\u021b\u0103. Nu exist\u0103 un dialog direct, sau un grup de lucru \u00eentre R. Moldova \u0219i F. Rus\u0103 cu privire la solu\u021bionarea diplomatic\u0103 a acestei probleme. Dimpotriv\u0103, de-a lungul a dou\u0103 decenii GOTR a reu\u0219it s\u0103 fie foarte activ \u00een peisajul geopolitic al Transnistriei. Acest lucru este eviden\u021biat prin mai multe aspecte, \u00eencep\u00e2nd cu \u00eenc\u0103lcarea principiilor stabilite \u00een Declara\u021bia de la Istanbul a Summit-ului OSCE din 1999[21]<\/a> \u0219i culmin\u00e2nd cu ultimele exerci\u021bii militare \u00een regiune.<\/p>\n Abunden\u021ba actorilor interna\u021bionali, mai ales \u00een perioada ultimilor cinci ani, a complicat \u0219i mai mult negocierea privind problema sta\u021bion\u0103rii trupelor ruse \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103. \u00centre membrii formatului \u201e5+2\u201d nu exist\u0103 o ordine de zi comun\u0103 cu privire la negocierea acestei probleme. Diferen\u021bele \u0219i interesele na\u021bionale \u00eempiedic\u0103 orice cooperare substan\u021bial\u0103. Aceste diferen\u021be \u00ee\u0219i trag r\u0103d\u0103cinile din istoria controversat\u0103 a politicii externe a actorilor interna\u021bionali implica\u021bi \u00een conflictul din Transnistria. Lipse\u0219te un consens interna\u021bional \u0219i regional coerent privind GOTR \u0219i rolul acestor trupe \u00een misiunea de pacificare. Prin urmare, dac\u0103 actorii interna\u021bionali nu sunt de acord cu o singur\u0103 agend\u0103 \u0219i un mecanism de rezolvare a problemei trupelor ruse din regiunea transnistrean\u0103, atunci \u0219i procesul politic de reglementare a conflictului transnistrean va avea de suportat ne\u00een\u021belegeri.<\/p>\n Pentru diploma\u021bia transnistrean\u0103, GOTR este o parte important\u0103 a func\u021bionalit\u0103\u021bii mecanismului de men\u021binere a p\u0103cii.[22]<\/a> \u00cens\u0103, r\u0103m\u00e2ne o \u00eentrebare deschis\u0103, dac\u0103 Transnistria este pentru F. Rus\u0103 o regiune satelit sau un aliat important. Factorul central care separ\u0103 aliatul de satelit este c\u0103 aliatul are dreptul la alegere. Aliatul alege o form\u0103 de rela\u021bie dup\u0103 voin\u021b\u0103, nu sub dictare. Satelitul, dimpotriv\u0103, \u00een mod voluntar sau sub presiune \u00ee\u0219i cedeaz\u0103 propria suveranitate \u0219i interesele personale \u00een favoarea altui actor interna\u021bional. La r\u00e2ndul s\u0103u actorul interna\u021bional \u00eens\u0103\u0219i hot\u0103r\u0103\u0219te de ce are nevoie \u00een aceast\u0103 etap\u0103 istoric\u0103: de un satelit sau aliat. Aceast\u0103 distinc\u021bie este de natur\u0103 fundamental\u0103. \u00cen mod natural, rela\u021bia dintre F. Rus\u0103 \u0219i Transnistria este una special\u0103, iar cea din urm\u0103 r\u0103m\u00e2ne a fi un satelit important din punct de vedere militar, care \u00een anumite condi\u021bii geopolitice poate fi transformat \u00eentr-un aliat \u00eempotriva unei ofensive. Contingentul militar de trupe ruse dislocat \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103, astfel, are misiunea de a influen\u021ba considera\u021biile ra\u021bionale de profitabilitate a unui format de rela\u021bii cu F. Rus\u0103, ci nu de non-alternativ\u0103.<\/p>\n De la sf\u00e2r\u0219itul anului trecut, to\u021bi participan\u021bii formatului \u201e5+2\u201d au fost \u00eencuraja\u021bi de trecerea la o nou\u0103 etap\u0103 de rela\u021bii \u00eentre Chi\u0219in\u0103u \u0219i Tiraspol. \u00cen luna noiembrie a anului 2017, \u00een urma a\u00a0 peste 30 de \u00eent\u00e2lniri ale grupurilor de lucru din Chi\u0219in\u0103u \u0219i Tiraspol, au fost semnate patru protocoale de cooperare \u0219i rezolvarea a unor probleme semnificative.[23]<\/a>\u00a0 \u00cen luna mai 2018 la Roma a avut loc \u00eent\u00e2lnirea participan\u021bilor formatului de negociere \u201e5+2\u201d.[24]<\/a> \u00centr-un mod tactic, \u00een ultima perioad\u0103, Chi\u0219in\u0103ul \u0219i Tiraspolul \u0219i-au confirmat angajamentele de a-\u0219i \u00eendeplini obliga\u021biile \u00een termenele convenite. \u00cens\u0103, pe fundalul acesta problema GOTR din regiunea transnistrean\u0103 r\u0103m\u00e2ne a fi nesolu\u021bionat\u0103. Evident, capacitatea militar\u0103 \u0219i opera\u021bional\u0103 a GOTR impune amenin\u021b\u0103ri de securitate la adresa R. Moldova \u0219i Ucrainei. F. Rus\u0103, la r\u00e2ndul s\u0103u, apreciaz\u0103 regiunea transnistrean\u0103 printr-o perspectiv\u0103 realist\u0103 de defensiv\u0103 sus\u021bin\u00e2nd ideea de a-\u0219i men\u021bine sfera de influen\u021b\u0103.<\/p>\n Cu toate acestea, pe fundalul complexit\u0103\u021bii spa\u021biului de securitate din regiune, nu sunt create instrumente reale interesate \u00een solu\u021bionarea problemei disloc\u0103rii trupelor ruse din regiune transnistrean\u0103.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n [1]<\/a> LACT, Publika.md \u2013 Pavel Filip: Chi\u015fin\u0103ul \u00ee\u015fi exprim\u0103 \u00eengrijorarea fa\u0163\u0103 de exerci\u021biile trupelor ruse\u015fti din st\u00e2nga Nistrului, <\/em>20.08.2018, \u00een https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/2018\/08\/20\/publika-md-pavel-filip-chisinaul-isi-exprima-ingrijorarea-fata-de-exercitiile-trupelor-rusesti-din-stanga-nistrului\/<\/a> (21.08.2018).<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> Parlamentul\u00a0 R. Moldova, Proiectul legii pentru aprobarea Strategiei na\u021bionale de ap\u0103rare \u0219i a Planului de ac\u021biuni privind implementarea Strategiei na\u021bionale de ap\u0103rare pentru anii 2018-2021<\/em>, 11.05.2018, \u00een http:\/\/www.parlament.md\/ProcesulLegislativ\/Proiectedeactelegislative\/tabid\/61\/LegislativId\/4194\/language\/ro-RO\/Default.aspx<\/a> (21.08.2018).<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Mihai Melintei, Cronologia Conflictului Transnistrean: Adnotat\u0103 Bibliografic (cu versiune \u00een limba rus\u0103), <\/em>Ed. Armanis, Sibiu, 2018, pp.334 \u2013 335.<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> General Assembly of the United Nations, Resolutions of the 72nd session, <\/em>in http:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/ga\/72\/resolutions.shtml<\/a> (21.08.2018).<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> \u0420\u0418\u0410 \u041d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u0412 \u041c\u0418\u0414 \u043d\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u0440\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044e\u0446\u0438\u044e \u041e\u041e\u041d \u043f\u043e \u041f\u0440\u0438\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0432\u044c\u044e \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0439,<\/em> 29.06.2018, \u0432 https:\/\/ria.ru\/world\/20180629\/1523644969.html<\/a> (21.08.2018).<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> \u0412\u0435\u0440\u0445\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0420\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u044b, \u0412\u0435\u0440\u0445\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0420\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u044b \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043d\u044f\u043b\u0430 \u0440\u044f\u0434 \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0432 \u043e \u0434\u0435\u043d\u043e\u043d\u0441\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0441\u043e\u0433\u043b\u0430\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043c\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0443 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u043c \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u044b \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u043c \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438<\/em>, 21.05.2015, \u0432 http:\/\/rada.gov.ua\/ru\/news\/Novosty\/Soobshchenyya\/109926.html<\/a> (21.08.2018).<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Parlamentul \u00a0R. Moldova, Proiectul legii pentru aprobarea Strategiei na\u021bionale de ap\u0103rare \u0219i a Planului de ac\u021biuni privind implementarea Strategiei na\u021bionale de ap\u0103rare pentru anii 2018-2021<\/em>, 11.05.2018, \u00een http:\/\/www.parlament.md\/ProcesulLegislativ\/Proiectedeactelegislative\/tabid\/61\/LegislativId\/4194\/language\/ro-RO\/Default.aspx<\/a> (21.08.2018).<\/p>\n [8]<\/a> \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u041e\u0431\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u044b \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438, \u041d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u042e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0412\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u041e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0430, <\/em>\u0432 https:\/\/structure.mil.ru\/structure\/okruga\/south\/news.htm<\/a> (22.08.2018).<\/p>\n [9]<\/a> \u041f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u044b \u0432 \u0420. \u041c\u043e\u043b\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430, \u041a\u043e\u043c\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0439 \u041f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u044b \u0432 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0435 \u041c\u043e\u043b\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u0432 \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0438 \u0441 \u043e\u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u044b\u043c \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0435\u0439 \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0438\u0445 \u043e\u0431\u044f\u0437\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u0438 \u0433\u0430\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0442\u0430 \u0432 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0441\u0441\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u0440\u0435\u0433\u0443\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f<\/em>, 17.08.2018, \u0432 https:\/\/moldova.mfa.gov.ua\/ru\/press-center\/news\/66636-komentar-posolystva-ukrajini-u-respublici-moldova-u-zvjazku-iz-chergovim-porushennyam-rosijsykoju-federacijeju-svojih-zobovjazany-poserednika-i-garanta-u-procesi-pridnistrovsykogo-vregulyuvannya<\/a> (22.08.2018).<\/p>\n [10]<\/a> U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa \/ U.S. 6th Fleet, USS Carney enters in Black Sea, <\/em>12.08.2018, in http:\/\/www.c6f.navy.mil\/news\/uss-carney-enters-black-sea-3<\/a> (22.08.2018).<\/p>\n [11]<\/a> Flot, \u0421\u043c\u0435\u0442\u043b\u0438\u0432\u044b\u0439<\/em>, \u0432 https:\/\/flot.com\/nowadays\/strength\/smetlivy\/<\/a> (22.08.2018).<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa \/ U.S. 6th Fleet, USS Carney DDG 64, Mission, <\/em>in http:\/\/www.c6f.navy.mil\/ships\/uss-carney<\/a> (22.08.2018).<\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Eugen Str\u0103u\u021biu, The Transnistrean Conflict Files, <\/em>Ed. Techno Media, Sibiu, 2017, p.217.<\/p>\n [14]<\/a> \u0422\u0410\u0421\u0421, \u041b\u0430\u0432\u0440\u043e\u0432: \u0432\u043e\u0439\u043d\u044b \u0432 \u041f\u0440\u0438\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0432\u044c\u0435 \u0445\u043e\u0442\u044f\u0442 \u0442\u0435, \u043a\u0442\u043e \u0434\u043e\u0431\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0432\u044b\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0420\u0424 \u0438\u0437 \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430, <\/em>01.09.2017, \u0432 https:\/\/tass.ru\/politika\/4524142<\/a> (23.08.2018).<\/p>\n [15]<\/a> \u041f\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438, \u0423\u043a\u0430\u0437 \u041f\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u2116 1144, <\/em>20.09.2010, \u0432 http:\/\/kremlin.ru\/acts\/bank\/31761<\/a> (23.08.2018).<\/p>\n [16]<\/a> \u0422\u0410\u0421\u0421, \u0417\u0430\u043f\u0430\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0432\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0442 \u0431\u043e\u043b\u0435\u0435 1 \u0442\u044b\u0441. \u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0446 \u0432\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u0442\u0435\u0445\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438 \u0434\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0446\u0430 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430, 05.08.2017, \u0432 https:\/\/tass.ru\/armiya-i-opk\/4464101<\/a> (23.08.2018).<\/p>\n [17]<\/a> \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u041e\u0431\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u044b \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438, 20-\u044f \u0433\u0432\u0430\u0440\u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u041a\u0440\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u0430\u0440\u043c\u0438\u044f<\/em>, \u0432 https:\/\/structure.mil.ru\/structure\/okruga\/details.htm?id=11251@egOrganization<\/a> (23.08.2018).<\/p>\n [18]<\/a> Eugen Str\u0103u\u021biu, The Transnistrean Conflict Files, <\/em>Ed. Techno Media, Sibiu, 2017, p.250.<\/p>\n [19]<\/a> \u0415\u0432\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0438\u044f \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442, \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0432\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0431\u0430\u0437\u044b \u0438 \u043e\u0431\u044a\u0435\u043a\u0442\u044b \u0437\u0430 \u0440\u0443\u0431\u0435\u0436\u043e\u043c: \u0411\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0441\u044c, \u041c\u043e\u043b\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430, \u041a\u0430\u0432\u043a\u0430\u0437,<\/em> 05.04.2017, \u0432 http:\/\/eurasia.expert\/rossiyskie-voennye-bazy-i-obekty-za-rubezhom-belarus-moldova-kavkaz\/<\/a> (24.08.2018).<\/p>\n [20]<\/a> \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442-\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0430, \u041f\u0440\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0437 \u041a\u043e\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0412\u043e\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0417\u0430\u043f\u0430\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0412\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u041e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0430, <\/em>07.12.2017, \u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442-\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433, \u2116 820 \u0434\u0441\u043f, \u0432 https:\/\/www.gov.spb.ru\/static\/writable\/ckeditor\/uploads\/2018\/01\/09\/\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0437%20820.pdf<\/a> \u00a0(24.08.2018).<\/p>\n [21]<\/a> OSCE, Istanbul Document 1999, in <\/em>https:\/\/www.osce.org\/mc\/39569?download=true<\/a>, pp.49-50.<\/p>\n [22]<\/a> \u0422\u0410\u0421\u0421, \u0412\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u041f\u0440\u0438\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0432\u044c\u044f \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0442\u0438\u0432 \u0438\u043d\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u044b \u041c\u043e\u043b\u0434\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0438 \u043e\u0431\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0432 \u041e\u041e\u041d \u0432\u044b\u0432\u043e\u0434 \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u043e\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445<\/em>, 16.06.2018, \u0432 https:\/\/tass.ru\/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama\/5297293<\/a> (25.08.2018).<\/p>\n [23]<\/a> Anuarul Laboratorului Pentru Analiza Conflictului Transnistrean, Documente, <\/em>Volumul I, Nr. 1, Sibiu, pp. 265-276.<\/p>\n [24]<\/a> OSCE, Protocol of the Official Meeting of the Permanent Conference for Political Questions in the Framework of the Negotiating Process on the Transdniestrian Settlement<\/em>, 30.05.2018, in https:\/\/www.osce.org\/chairmanship\/382885<\/a> (25.08.2018).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Evenimentele din Europa de Sud \u2013 Est din ultimii ani demonstreaz\u0103 c\u0103 mediul de securitate interna\u021bional devine tot mai complex. Prin urmare, observ\u0103m o continu\u0103 transformare a caracteristicilor securit\u0103\u021bii \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103, cu influen\u021be de tip politic, militar, economic, cibernetic \u0219i socio-cultural. \u00cen mod direct \u0219i indirect apar disensiuni \u00eentre actorii statali participan\u021bi la procesul…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[7],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5305"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5305"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5305\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5306,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5305\/revisions\/5306"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5305"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5305"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5305"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}