{"id":5085,"date":"2018-07-08T14:32:02","date_gmt":"2018-07-08T12:32:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/?p=5085"},"modified":"2018-07-08T14:32:02","modified_gmt":"2018-07-08T12:32:02","slug":"mihai-melintei-relatia-geoenergetica-dintre-gazprom-moldovagaz-si-tiraspoltransgaz-in-perspectiva-conflictului-transnistrean","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/mihai-melintei-relatia-geoenergetica-dintre-gazprom-moldovagaz-si-tiraspoltransgaz-in-perspectiva-conflictului-transnistrean\/","title":{"rendered":"Mihai Melintei: Rela\u021bia geoenergetic\u0103 dintre Gazprom \/ Moldovagaz \u0219i Tiraspoltransgaz \u00een perspectiva conflictului transnistrean"},"content":{"rendered":"

Gazprom este un monopol rus al industriei de petrol \u0219i gaze, aflat pe locul doi \u00een F. Rus\u0103 \u00een func\u021bie de capitalizare, \u00een anul 2017.[1]<\/a> Compania, adesea, este folosit\u0103 de Kremlin ca un instrument de influen\u021b\u0103 \u00een politica sa extern\u0103. Aceast\u0103 companie imens\u0103 forjat\u0103 de c\u0103tre L. Beria \u0219i N. Hru\u0219ciov, reprezint\u0103 \u00een prezent o putere capabil\u0103 s\u0103 influen\u021beze situa\u021bia geopolitic\u0103 din diferite regiuni, inclusiv Transnistria.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Harta traseului gazoductelor \u00een R. Moldova[2]<\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

Unul dintre principalele motive pentru care Transnistria \u00ee\u0219i continu\u0103 existen\u021ba este gazul \u201etranzitat gratuit\u201d. Transnistria, \u00een pozi\u021bia sa de stat nerecunoscut, continu\u0103 s\u0103 importe gaze din F. Rus\u0103 f\u0103r\u0103 s\u0103 le pl\u0103teasc\u0103 costurile. Pre\u021bul gazului \u00een regiune este foarte sc\u0103zut, iar diverse \u00eentreprinderi care utilizeaz\u0103 acest gaz au o contribu\u021bie imens\u0103 \u00een dezvoltarea economiei Transnistriei. Guvernul rus aprob\u0103 exportul de gaze \u201egratuit\u201d, pentru c\u0103 unele din aceste \u00eentreprinderi apar\u021bin marilor concerne ruse\u0219ti: Centrala Termoelectric\u0103 de la Cuciurgan este de\u021binut\u0103 de compania rus\u0103 \u201eInter RAO\u201d, iar Uzina metalurgic\u0103 \u0219i de ciment a fost de\u021binut\u0103 p\u00e2n\u0103 \u00een 2015 de c\u0103tre compania rus\u0103 \u201eMetalloinvest\u201d; \u00een prezent apar\u021bine statului. Energia electric\u0103 \u0219i metalul reprezint\u0103 65% din totalul exporturilor Transnistriei[3]<\/a>, astfel \u00eenc\u00e2t, dac\u0103 cel pu\u021bin una dintre aceste \u00eentreprinderi \u00eenceteaz\u0103 s\u0103 mai func\u021bioneze, economia regiunii transnistrene va avea de suferit consecin\u021be negative. La r\u00e2ndul s\u0103u, F. Rus\u0103 este interesat\u0103 s\u0103 men\u021bin\u0103 o oarecare stabilitate economic\u0103 \u00een regiune, astfel c\u0103 Gazprom va continua s\u0103 furnizeze gaz \u00een Transnistria, \u00een ciuda arieratelor de plat\u0103. Aceste datorii de gaz vor fi transferate Republicii Moldova. \u00cen luna mai 2018 compania Gazprom a depus la Curtea Interna\u021bional\u0103 de Arbitraj Comercial pe l\u00e2ng\u0103 Camera de Comer\u021b \u0219i Industrie a Rusiei, un proces nou \u00eempotriva Moldovagaz, cu solicitarea de a recupera datoriile pentru gazul livrat \u00een baza contractului cu R. Moldova \u00een valoare de 475,8 milioane $. Acesta a fost al 13-lea proces al Gazprom privind colectarea datoriilor istorice de la Moldovagaz. Cele dou\u0103sprezece procese anterioare au fost satisf\u0103cute, suma total\u0103 de recuperare dep\u0103\u0219e\u0219te cifra de 5 miliarde $, din care aproximativ 95% este datoria Transnistriei.[4]<\/a> Este interesat de analizat faptul c\u0103 din fostele state ale URSS, R. Moldova (anul 2016) se afl\u0103 pe locul doi privind cump\u0103rarea gazului de la compania Gazprom, dup\u0103 Belarus (vezi tabelul Gazprom privind volumul v\u00e2nz\u0103rilor de gaz[5]<\/a>). Mai mult de at\u00e2t, cel mai scump gaz din fostele state ale URSS este \u00een Armenia \u0219i R. Moldova, unde at\u00e2t Gazprom Armenia (furnizor de gaze naturale \u00een Armenia) c\u00e2t \u0219i Moldovagaz (furnizor de gaze naturale \u00een R. Moldova) sunt companii subsidiare ale Gazprom. Potrivit statisticilor\u00a0 R. Moldova a pl\u0103tit, p\u00e2n\u0103 \u00een luna mai 2018, pentru 1.000 m3<\/sup> de gaz\u00a0 tarife de 180 – 190 $, utilizatorul final pl\u0103tind pentru aceea\u0219i cantitate de gaz aproximativ 372,9 $,[6]<\/a> Armenia la r\u00e2ndul s\u0103u pl\u0103te\u0219te pentru 1.000 m3<\/sup> de gaz tarif de 150 $, utilizatorul final pl\u0103tind aproximativ 290 $.[7]<\/a> Ambele state au probleme teritoriale nesolu\u021bionate, \u00een R. Moldova \u2013 Transnistria, \u00een Armenia \u2013 Nagorno Karabah (\u00een care este implicat \u0219i Azerbaidjanul) \u00een 2016 av\u00e2nd loc o criz\u0103 major\u0103 \u00een aceast\u0103 regiune[8]<\/a>. Din anul 2013 \u0219i p\u00e2n\u0103 \u00een 2017, Armenia \u0219i R. Moldova au cump\u0103rat de la Gazprom, 22,7 miliarde m3<\/sup> de gaz.\u00a0 Pre\u021burile \u00een aceast\u0103 perioad\u0103 variind de la 194,2 $ pentru 1.000 m3<\/sup> de gaz la 158,4 $ (pentru mai multe detalii vezi Raportul Anual al Gazprom 2017).[9]<\/a><\/p>\n

Formarea politicii tarifare a companiei Gazprom necesit\u0103 o analiz\u0103 a contextului politicii externe a F. Ruse, deoarece adesea tarifele pentru gazele naturale sunt un fel de indicator al intereselor geopolitice ale F. Ruse. Diferen\u021ba \u00eentre Moldovagaz \u0219i Gazprom Armenia este c\u0103, \u00een cazul primei companii, Gazprom de\u021bine doar 50% + 1 din pachetul de ac\u021biuni a Moldovagaz, Guvernul R. Moldova, 35,33% , iar Comitetul de administrare a propriet\u0103\u021bii Transnistriei de\u021bine 13,44%,[10]<\/a> pe c\u00e2nd \u00een Armenia, Gazprom de\u021bine 100% din ac\u021biunile companiei Gazprom Armenia.[11]<\/a><\/p>\n

Moldova \u0219i Armenia, prin prisma situa\u021biei geopolitice complicate, sunt un exemplu \u00een care F. Rus\u0103 aplic\u0103 soft power<\/em> \u00een contextul tarifelor de gaz \u0219i tranzit\u0103rii acestuia. Gazprom va forma tarife speciale pentru gazele naturale de pe pia\u021ba moldoveneasc\u0103, care se vor identifica cu componenta politic\u0103 \u0219i geopolitic\u0103 a \u021b\u0103rii \u0219i \u00een mod special a regiunii transnistrene. Gazprom \u00een prezent exercit\u0103 controlul absolut asupra pie\u021bei de gaze naturale din R. Moldova. Este unicul furnizor viabil de gaz natural, de\u021bine ac\u021biunile Moldovagaz \u0219i controleaz\u0103, indirect, pachetul de ac\u021biuni din Transnistria prin compania Tiraspoltransgaz. Activitatea companiei Moldovagaz este axat\u0103 pe dou\u0103 structuri, prima fiind furnizarea \u0219i distribu\u021bia de gaz natural consumatorilor din R. Moldova (prin filiale la nivel local de exemplu: B\u0103l\u021bi-gaz, Orhei-gaz, Flore\u0219ti-gaz etc.) \u0219i regiunea transnistrean\u0103 (Tiraspol-gaz, Bender-gaz etc.), a doua fiind tranzitul gazelor naturale \u00een regiunea Balcanilor (pentru mai multe detalii vezi structura corporativ\u0103 a Moldovagaz).[12]<\/a> Gazul natural este transportat \u0219i tranzitat de \u00eentreprinderile Moldovatransgaz \u0219i Tiraspoltransgaz (\u00een Transnistria) al c\u0103ror fondator este Moldovagaz.[13]<\/a> \u00centreprinderile Moldovatransgaz \u0219i Tiraspoltransgaz (din regiunea transnistrean\u0103) particip\u0103 la tranzitul de gaz rusesc \u00een Grecia \u2013 flan\u0219a Sidirokastron, Turcia \u2013 flan\u0219a Malkotlar, Bulgaria \u2013 flan\u0219a Negru Vod\u0103, Isaccea, Republica Macedonia \u2013\u00a0 flan\u0219a Zidilovo, Rom\u00e2nia \u2013 flan\u0219a\u00a0 Isaccea.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n

Dac\u0103 vom aplica analiza cost-beneficiu asupra activit\u0103\u021bii Gazprom \u00een R. Moldova \u0219i regiunea transnistrean\u0103, vom putea analiza evaluarea impactului unei situa\u021bii sau ac\u021biuni proiectate at\u00e2t pe plan intern c\u00e2t \u0219i pe plan extern. Tranzitul gazului rusesc prin regiunea transnistrean\u0103 \u0219i R. Moldova este un proiect important pentru Gazprom, implic\u00e2nd \u0219i statul vecin Ucraina, care spre deosebire de R. Moldova are capacitatea \u0219i de depozitare a gazului. Drept efect, tranzitul gazului rusesc prin R. Moldova depinde foarte mult de situa\u021bia din Ucraina, iar pe fundalul crizei din Donbas, atitudinea Cabinetului de Mini\u0219tri de la Kiev fa\u021b\u0103 de regiunea transnistrean\u0103 s-a \u00eenr\u0103ut\u0103\u021bit.<\/p>\n

Prin urmare, tranzitul gazului rusesc prin R. Moldova are un impact major pentru Gazprom din punct de vedere financiar. De exemplu, \u00een anul 2017, R. Moldova a participat la tranzitul de gaz \u00een regiunea Balcani \u0219i Turcia \u00een volum de 36,54 miliarde m3<\/sup> de gaz.[15]<\/a> \u00cens\u0103 efectele favorabile sunt \u00eenregistrate mai mult pentru Gazprom \u0219i regiunea transnistrean\u0103, care beneficiaz\u0103 \u00een urma tranzitului gazului rusesc, dec\u00e2t pentru R. Moldova. Pentru Gazprom, acest proiect de tranzit al gazului este favorabil, pentru c\u0103 \u00eei permite s\u0103-\u0219i alimenteze \u201egratuit\u201d cu gaz uzinele \u0219i \u00eentreprinderile ruse\u0219ti din Transnistria – de exemplu, Centrala Termoelectric\u0103 de la Cuciurgan, care lucreaz\u0103 pe gaz, \u00een anul 2017 a acoperit nevoile de energie electric\u0103 ale locuitorilor din R. Moldova \u00een volum de 70%. Prin urmare, de c\u00e2\u0219tigat financiar au avut compania Gazprom \u0219i regiunea transnistrean\u0103. Impactul tranzitului de gaz rusesc\u00a0 prin prisma analizei cost-beneficiu poate fi clarificat \u00een felul urm\u0103tor:<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
 <\/td>\nPentru beneficii<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Care este \u021binta opera\u021biunii, cine ar trebui s\u0103 beneficieze?<\/strong><\/td>\nObiectivul este furnizarea gazului natural \u0219i tranzitul acestuia \u00een regiunea Balcanilor \u00een conformitate cu contractul \u00eencheiat \u00eentre Moldovagaz \u0219i Gazprom. Beneficiarul acestui contract este R. Moldova (Moldovagaz) \u0219i compania ruseasc\u0103 Gazprom.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Cine beneficiaz\u0103 de fapt?<\/strong><\/td>\nBeneficiarii reali sunt Gazprom \u0219i Transnistria (prin \u00eenterprinderea Tiraspoltransgaz).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
C\u00e2t de mare este beneficiul total al opera\u021biunii?<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00cen anul 2016, Gazprom a livrat \u00een R. Moldova 3 miliarde m3<\/sup> de gaz. 11% din exportul de gaze naturale ale Gazprom sunt tranzitate prin gazoductele care traverseaz\u0103 R. Moldova \u0219i regiunea transnistrean\u0103.[16]<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Care este distribu\u021bia beneficiilor \u00een r\u00e2ndul celor care se implic\u0103?<\/strong><\/td>\nDin 3 miliarde m3<\/sup> de gaz livrat \u00een R. Moldova, aproximativ 2 miliarde sunt consumate de \u00eentreprinderile industriale din Transnistria \u0219i produc\u0103torul de electricitate. Toate liniile de electricitate \u00een R. Moldova pornesc din regiunea transnistrean\u0103.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u00a0<\/strong><\/td>\nPentru costuri<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Cine ar trebui s\u0103 suporte costurile opera\u021biunii?<\/strong><\/td>\nCosturile opera\u021biunii de tranzit a gazului sunt suportate de c\u0103tre companiile Gazprom \u0219i Moldovagaz, prin contractul \u00eencheiat \u00eentre p\u0103r\u021bi, care expir\u0103 la sf\u00e2r\u0219itul anului 2019.[17]<\/a><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Cine pl<\/strong>\u0103te\u0219te \u00een prezent costurile opera\u021biunii pe plan intern? <\/strong><\/td>\nPentru gazul livrat \u00een R. Moldova, pl\u0103te\u0219te doar compania Moldovagaz, iar toate arieratele de plat\u0103 a Tiraspoltransgaz sunt transferate companiei Moldovagaz. Prin urmare regiunii transnistrene \u00eei este livrat gaz \u201egratuit\u201d.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Care este costul opera\u021biunii?<\/strong><\/td>\nCostul opera\u021biunii variaz\u0103 \u00eentre 150 \u2013 190 $ pentru 1.000 m3<\/sup> de gaz.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Cum sunt distribuite costurile?<\/strong><\/td>\nCompania Moldovagaz pl\u0103te\u0219te costurile consumatorilor R. Moldova \u0219i regiunii transnistrene. Astfel, costurile nu sunt distribuite, exist\u0103 un singur pl\u0103titor.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Care este distribu\u021bia curent\u0103 a costurilor pentru persoane?<\/strong><\/td>\nTarifele pentru gaz \u00een partea dreapt\u0103 a Nistrului sunt mai mari dec\u00e2t cele din regiunea transnistrean\u0103 (vezi tarifele Moldovagaz[18]<\/a> \u0219i Tiraspoltransgaz[19]<\/a>).<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u00cen urma acestei analize cost-beneficiu putem afirma c\u0103 Gazprom de\u021bine controlul absolut \u00een circuitul de tranzit pe care \u00eel are \u00een R. Moldova \u0219i regiunea transnistrean\u0103; mai mult de at\u00e2t, pentru partea transnistrean\u0103 acest circuit de gaze naturale este viabil, pentru c\u0103 asigur\u0103 activitatea unor importante zone industriale ale regiunii. Gazprom este interesat \u00een continuare s\u0103 tranziteze gaz prin R. Moldova \u0219i regiunea transnistrean\u0103. Chiar dac\u0103 nu aduce beneficii financiare, acest proiect aduce un atu <\/em>geopolitic \u00een regiune, care permite F. Ruse s\u0103-\u0219i men\u021bin\u0103 o autoritate \u0219i influen\u021b\u0103. \u00cen situa\u021bia actual\u0103, Gazprom nu se orienteaz\u0103 dup\u0103 considerentele de pia\u021b\u0103, pentru c\u0103 fiind un concern de stat, ac\u021bioneaz\u0103 ca un instrument de politic\u0103 extern\u0103. Regiunea transnistrean\u0103 este profitabil\u0103 pentru Gazprom din punt de vedere geopolitic\/geoenergetic. Furniz\u00e2nd gaze naturale prin compania Gazprom, F. Rus\u0103 \u00ee\u0219i \u00eent\u0103re\u0219te influen\u021ba politic\u0103 \u00een regiune \u0219i chiar \u00een \u021b\u0103rile din sud-estul Europei. Gazprom are o strategie de tip triad\u0103 <\/em>cu privire la exportul de gaze naturale \u00een R. Moldova \u0219i regiunea transnistrean\u0103: a maximizat r\u0103spunsurile la principalele provoc\u0103ri ale fiec\u0103rei ac\u021biuni, \u0219i-a consolidat pozi\u021bia pe pia\u021b\u0103, reduc\u00e2nd riscurile \u00een ceea ce prive\u0219te tranzitul de gaz \u0219i a dezvoltat un poten\u021bial de export, cre\u00e2nd obstacole pentru concuren\u021bi \u00een implementarea strategiilor, anticip\u00e2nd \u0219i bloc\u00e2nd ac\u021biunile lor.<\/p>\n

Pozi\u021bia geografic\u0103 a coridorului regiunii transnistrene de tranzit al gazului rusesc, \u00een mare parte depinde de tranzitul gazului prin Ucraina, care are cel mai optim \u0219i mai ieftin traseu pentru livrarea gazului din regiunea Nadym-Pur-Taz[20]<\/a> spre Europa. Contractul de tranzit \u00eentre Gazprom (F. Rus\u0103) \u0219i Naftogaz (Ucraina) expir\u0103 \u00een 2019.[21]<\/a><\/p>\n

Evident c\u0103 sunt posibile mai multe variante ale evolu\u021biei evenimentelor, care includ \u0219i pozi\u021bia R. Moldova \u0219i regiunii transnistrene, care depind de tranzitul gazului rusesc prin Ucraina. Una din aceste variante poate fi extinderea infrastructurii europene de gaze pe baza surselor europene de finan\u021bare. \u021a\u0103rile europene care sunt interesate s\u0103 continue comer\u021bul cu Gazprom vor construi noi re\u021bele de gaz \u00een cadrul celui de-al treilea pachet energetic. Despre al treilea pachet energetic \u0219i reorganizarea companiei Moldovagaz \u00een conformitate cu reformele prev\u0103zute de Acordul de asociere R. Moldova \u2013 UE, au discutat premierul R. Moldova, P. Filip, \u0219i vice-pre\u0219edintele Gazprom, V. Golubev, \u00een cadrul vizitei acestuia \u00een R. Moldova la data de 21 iunie 2018.[22]<\/a> \u00a0O alt\u0103 variant\u0103 ar fi, ca din 2020 Gazprom s\u0103 transporte gazul natural p\u00e2n\u0103 la frontiera cu Ucraina, iar din Ucraina subsidiarele companiei Gazprom (cum ar fi Moldovagaz sau Tiraspoltransgaz) s\u0103 tranziteze de sine st\u0103t\u0103tor gazul de pe teritoriul Ucrainei. Aceast\u0103 variant\u0103 poate fi una temporar\u0103, pentru c\u0103 contrazice intereselor F. Ruse. O alt\u0103 op\u021biune ar fi semnarea unui nou acord de tranzit \u00eentre F. Rus\u0103 \u0219i Ucraina pe baza unor condi\u021bii diferite de cele din prezent. \u00cen acest caz, pre\u021burile pentru tranzitul de gaz pot fi extrem de volatile cu efecte majore pentru R. Moldova \u0219i regiunea transnistrean\u0103 care depinde de tranzitul de gaze naturale. Totodat\u0103, regiunea transnistrean\u0103 va fi influen\u021bat\u0103 de reorganizarea companiei Moldovagaz, care va produce efecte directe asupra Tiraspoltransgaz. La momentul de fa\u021b\u0103 se ini\u021biaz\u0103 formarea unui grup de lucru, alc\u0103tuit din reprezentan\u021bi ai Gazprom, Moldovagaz \u0219i Tiraspoltransgaz,\u00a0 care vor dezvolta un algoritm cu privire la tranzitul de gaze naturale \u00eencep\u00e2nd cu anul 2020.[23]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u00cen concluzie putem afirma c\u0103, formatului de rela\u021bii dintre Gazprom, Moldovagaz \u0219i Tiraspoltransgaz, trebuie acordat o aten\u021bie deosebit\u0103. F. Rus\u0103, prin compania Gazprom, a \u00eenceput s\u0103 ia \u00een considerare multe schimb\u0103ri din regiune \u0219i nu se limiteaz\u0103 exclusiv la calculele geopolitice. Diminuarea dependen\u021bei de tranzit a Gazprom fa\u021b\u0103 de Naftogaz va aduce efecte directe asupra companiei Moldovagaz. R. Moldova depinde foarte mult de importul de resurse energetice, care sunt introduse prin frontiera de est, postul vamal Bender-2.[24]<\/a> \u00cens\u0103, tranzitul de gaz rusesc prin Ucraina nu poate fi abandonat complet, deoarece sistarea \u00a0posibilelor c\u0103i de aprovizionare reduce capacitatea companiei Gazprom de a manevra \u0219i de a g\u0103si modalit\u0103\u021bi mai avantajoase de aprovizionare. Totodat\u0103, F. Rus\u0103 nu va permite ca prin conductele sale de gaz sa fie tranzitat gaz str\u0103in. Prin gazoductele companiei Gazprom se tranziteaz\u0103 nu numai gaz, dar \u0219i ideologie, care a primit posibilitatea de a uni sau diviza teritoriile, fiind \u0219i un factor important \u00een reglementarea politic\u0103 \u0219i economic\u0103 a conflictului transnistrean.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

BIBLIOGRAFIE GENERAL\u0102<\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

I. Studii \u0219i articole<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00cen limba englez\u0103<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Gazprom Export, Gas supplies to Europe, <\/em>PAO Gazprom, 2017;<\/li>\n
  2. Ishaan, Tharoor, The crisis over Nagorno-Karabakh, explained<\/em>, \u201eThe Washington Post\u201d, 05.04.2016;<\/li>\n
  3. Simon, Pirani, Katja, Yafimava, Russian Gaz Transit Across Ukraine Post \u2013 2019: pipeline scenarios, gas flow consequnces, and regulatory constraints<\/em>, \u201eThe Oxford Institute for Energy Studies\u201d, February, Oxford, 2016;<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

     <\/p>\n

    \u00cen limba rus\u0103<\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
    1. \u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c, \u041c\u0430\u0440\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433: \u0421\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u044b \u0431\u044b\u0432\u0448\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0421\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0421\u043e\u044e\u0437\u0430<\/em>, \u041f\u0410\u041e \u00ab\u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u00bb, 2018;<\/li>\n
    2. \u0413\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0422\u0430\u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442 \u041f\u041c\u0420, \u0422\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0440\u0442\u0430 \u041f\u041c\u0420 \u0441\u043e \u0432\u0441\u0435\u043c\u0438 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0437\u0430 \u044f\u043d\u0432\u0430\u0440\u044c-\u043c\u0430\u0439 2018 \u0433.;<\/em><\/li>\n
    3. \u041d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0410\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043d\u0435\u0444\u0442\u0435\u0433\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0438\u0441\u0430, \u00ab\u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u00bb \u0438 \u00ab\u041c\u043e\u043b\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0437\u00bb \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u0432\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u044b \u0441\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0443\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430<\/em>, 15.03.2017;<\/li>\n
    4. \u0421\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a, \u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c \u0432 \u0446\u0438\u0444\u0440\u0430\u0445 2013-2017, <\/em>\u041f\u0410\u041e \u00ab\u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u00bb, 2018;<\/li>\n
    5. \u0420\u0418\u0410 \u0420\u0435\u0439\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433, \u0422\u041e\u041f-100 \u043a\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043d\u0435\u0439\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u043e \u043a\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u2013 2018<\/em>;<\/em><\/li>\n
    6. \u0420\u0418\u0410 \u0420\u0435\u0439\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433, \u0420\u0435\u0439\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d \u043f\u043e \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0433\u0430\u0437\u0430 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0441\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0432 2018 \u0433.<\/em>;<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

       <\/p>\n

      II. Surse web<\/strong><\/p>\n

      \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

        \n
      1. www.arka.am<\/a><\/li>\n
      2. www.armenia.gazprom.ru<\/a><\/li>\n
      3. www.customs.gospmr.org<\/a><\/li>\n
      4. www.delo.ua<\/a><\/li>\n
      5. www.gazprom.com<\/a><\/li>\n
      6. www.gazpromexport.ru<\/a><\/li>\n
      7. www.lact.ro<\/a><\/li>\n
      8. www.moldovagaz.md<\/a><\/li>\n
      9. www.predisent.gospmr.org<\/a><\/li>\n
      10. www.publika.md<\/a><\/li>\n
      11. www.ttgpmr.com<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

         <\/p>\n

        Note bibliografice:<\/strong><\/p>\n

        [1]<\/a> \u0420\u0418\u0410 \u0420\u0435\u0439\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433, \u0422\u041e\u041f-100 \u043a\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043d\u0435\u0439\u0448\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u043e \u043a\u0430\u043f\u0438\u0442\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u2013 2018<\/em>, \u0432 http:\/\/www.riarating.ru\/infografika\/20180130\/630080911.html<\/a> (29.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [2]<\/a> Gazprom, Gazprom and Moldovagaz address cooperation prospects<\/em>, 14.03.2017, in http:\/\/www.gazprom.com\/press\/news\/2017\/march\/article312102\/<\/a> (29.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [3]<\/a> \u0413\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0422\u0430\u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u041a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442 \u041f\u041c\u0420, \u0422\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0440\u0442\u0430 \u041f\u041c\u0420 \u0441\u043e \u0432\u0441\u0435\u043c\u0438 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0437\u0430 \u044f\u043d\u0432\u0430\u0440\u044c-\u043c\u0430\u0439 2018 \u0433., <\/em>13.06.2018, <\/em>\u0432 http:\/\/customs.gospmr.org\/2014-2.html<\/a> (29.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [4]<\/a> REGNUM, \u0414\u0435\u043d\u044c\u0433\u0438 \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u041f\u041c\u0420? \u00ab\u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u00bb \u0442\u0440\u0435\u0431\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0441 \u041c\u043e\u043b\u0434\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0438 \u0435\u0449\u0435 $0,5 \u043c\u043b\u0440\u0434 \u0434\u043e\u043b\u0433\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0433\u0430\u0437,<\/em> 17.05.2018, \u0432 https:\/\/regnum.ru\/news\/2416703.html<\/a> (29.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [5]<\/a> \u0421\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a, \u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c \u0432 \u0446\u0438\u0444\u0440\u0430\u0445 2013-2017, <\/em>\u041f\u0410\u041e \u00ab\u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u00bb, 2018, \u0441\u0442\u0440. 77.<\/p>\n

        [6]<\/a> \u0420\u0418\u0410 \u0420\u0415\u0419\u0422\u0418\u041d\u0413, \u0420\u0435\u0439\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d \u043f\u043e \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0433\u0430\u0437\u0430 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0441\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0432 2018 \u0433.<\/em>, 19.06.2018, \u0432 http:\/\/riarating.ru\/countries\/20180619\/630096994.html<\/a> (29.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [7]<\/a> Arka, Natural gas price to remain unchanged in Armenia in 2018 \u2013 paper<\/em>, 29.11.2017, in http:\/\/arka.am\/en\/news\/society\/natural_gas_price_to_remain_unchanged_in_armenia_in_2018_paper\/<\/a> (29.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [8]<\/a> Ishaan Tharoor, The crisis over Nagorno-Karabakh, explained<\/em>, in \u201eThe Washington Post\u201d, 05.04.2016, https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/news\/worldviews\/wp\/2016\/04\/05\/how-the-crisis-over-nagorno-karabakh-could-get-worse-fast\/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ebde1ba18295<\/a> (30.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [9]<\/a> Gazprom, \u041c\u0430\u0440\u043a\u0435\u0442\u0438\u043d\u0433: \u0421\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u044b \u0431\u044b\u0432\u0448\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0421\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0421\u043e\u044e\u0437\u0430<\/em>, \u0432 http:\/\/www.gazprom.ru\/about\/marketing\/cis-baltia\/<\/a> (30.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [10]<\/a> Moldova, Moldovagaz and Gazprom agree on prolonging the contract until 31 December 2019, in <\/em>http:\/\/www.moldova.org\/en\/moldovagaz-gazprom-agree-prolonging-contract-31-december-2019\/<\/a> (30.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [11]<\/a> \u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c \u0410\u0440\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f, \u041e \u043a\u043e\u043c\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438, <\/em>\u0432 http:\/\/armenia.gazprom.ru<\/a> (30.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [12]<\/a> Moldovagaz, Structura,<\/em> \u00een http:\/\/www.moldovagaz.md\/rom\/despre-companie\/structura<\/a> (30.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [13]<\/a> Moldovagaz, Despre companie<\/em>, \u00een http:\/\/www.moldovagaz.md\/rom\/despre-companie<\/a> (30.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [14]<\/a> Simon Pirani, Katja Yafimava, Russian Gaz Transit Across Ukraine Post \u2013 2019: pipeline scenarios, gas flow consequnces, and regulatory constraints<\/em>, in \u201eThe Oxford Institute for Energy Studies\u201d, February 2016, Oxford, pp. 57-58.<\/p>\n

        [15]<\/a> Gazprom Export, Gas supplies to Europe, <\/em>in http:\/\/www.gazpromexport.ru\/en\/statistics\/<\/a> (30.06.2018).<\/p>\n

        [16]<\/a> Gazprom, Gazprom and Moldova discuss ongoing cooperation in energy sector<\/em>, 27.12.2017, in http:\/\/www.gazprom.com\/press\/news\/2017\/december\/article389857\/<\/a> (01.07.2018).<\/p>\n

        [17]<\/a> \u041d\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0410\u0441\u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043d\u0435\u0444\u0442\u0435\u0433\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0438\u0441\u0430, \u00ab\u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u00bb \u0438 \u00ab\u041c\u043e\u043b\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0437\u00bb \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0441\u043c\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043b\u0438 \u0432\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u044b \u0441\u043e\u0442\u0440\u0443\u0434\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430<\/em>, 15.03.2017, \u0432 https:\/\/nangs.org\/news\/business\/gazprom-i-moldovagaz-rassmotreli-voprosy-sotrudnichestva<\/a> (01.07.2018).<\/p>\n

        [18]<\/a> Moldovagaz, Tarifele<\/em>, \u00een http:\/\/www.moldovagaz.md\/rom\/consumatori\/tarifele<\/a> (01.07.2018).<\/p>\n

        [19]<\/a> \u0422\u0438\u0440\u0430\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0422\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0413\u0430\u0437-\u041f\u0440\u0438\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0432\u044c\u0435, \u041e\u0442\u043f\u0443\u0441\u043a\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0442\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0444\u044b \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0433\u0430\u0437 \u043d\u0430 2018 \u0433\u043e\u0434, <\/em>\u0432 http:\/\/www.ttgpmr.com\/content\/\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0444\u044b-\u0434\u043b\u044f-\u044e\u0440\u0438\u0434\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0445-\u043b\u0438\u0446-\u043d\u0430-2018<\/a> (01.07.2018).<\/p>\n

        [20]<\/a> Gazprom, Gazprom Dobycha Nadym, <\/em>in http:\/\/www.gazprom.com\/about\/subsidiaries\/list-items\/gazprom-dobycha-nadym\/<\/a> (01.07.2018).<\/p>\n

        [21]<\/a> Delo, \u041a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0442 \u043d\u0430 \u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0437\u0438\u0442 \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0442 \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0434\u043e 2019 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u2014 \u0412\u0438\u0442\u0440\u0435\u043d\u043a<\/em>, 05.03.2018, \u0432 https:\/\/delo.ua\/business\/kontrakt-na-tranzit-budet-dejstvovat-do-2019-goda-vitrenko-339860\/<\/a> (01.07.2018).<\/p>\n

        [22]<\/a> Publika, \u041f\u0440\u0435\u043c\u044c\u0435\u0440-\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440 \u041f\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043b \u0424\u0438\u043b\u0438\u043f \u0432\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0442\u0438\u043b\u0441\u044f \u0441 \u0432\u0438\u0446\u0435-\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u043e\u043c “\u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u0430” \u0412\u0430\u043b\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0413\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0431\u0435\u0432\u044b\u043c<\/em>, 21.06.2018, \u0432 https:\/\/ru.publika.md\/premer-ministr-pavel-filip-vstretilsya-s-vice-prezidentom-gazproma-valeriem-golubevym-_2159152.html<\/a> (02.07.2018).<\/p>\n

        [23]<\/a> \u041f\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442 \u041f\u0440\u0438\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u041c\u043e\u043b\u0434\u0430\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0438, \u0413\u043b\u0430\u0432\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0434\u043d\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0433\u043e\u0441\u0443\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0432\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435\u0442\u0438\u043b\u0441\u044f \u0441 \u0437\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043c \u041f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u041f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u041f\u0410\u041e \u00ab\u0413\u0430\u0437\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043c\u00bb \u0412\u0430\u043b\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0435\u043c \u0413\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0431\u0435\u0432\u044b\u043c<\/em>, 21.06.2018, \u0432 http:\/\/president.gospmr.org\/press-sluzhba\/novosti\/vstrecha-s-golubevim-gazprom.html<\/a> (02.07.2018).<\/p>\n

        [24]<\/a> LACT, Guvernul a aprobat modific\u0103ri la Hot\u0103r\u00eerea Guvernului nr.1232 din 09 noiembrie 2016 \u201eCu privire la unele aspecte de introducere a produselor petroliere prin frontiera de est\u201d,<\/em> 20.06.2018, \u00een https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/2018\/06\/20\/gov-md-guvernul-a-aprobat-modificari-la-hotarirea-guvernului-nr-1232-din-09-noiembrie-2016-cu-privire-la-unele-aspecte-de-introducere-a-produselor-petroliere-prin-frontiera-de-est\/<\/a> (03.07.2018).<\/p>\n

         <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        Gazprom este un monopol rus al industriei de petrol \u0219i gaze, aflat pe locul doi \u00een F. Rus\u0103 \u00een func\u021bie de capitalizare, \u00een anul 2017.[1] Compania, adesea, este folosit\u0103 de Kremlin ca un instrument de influen\u021b\u0103 \u00een politica sa extern\u0103. Aceast\u0103 companie imens\u0103 forjat\u0103 de c\u0103tre L. Beria \u0219i N. Hru\u0219ciov, reprezint\u0103 \u00een prezent o…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[7],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5085"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5085"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5085\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5345,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5085\/revisions\/5345"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5085"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5085"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5085"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}