{"id":4856,"date":"2018-05-31T07:56:49","date_gmt":"2018-05-31T05:56:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/?p=4856"},"modified":"2018-05-31T07:56:49","modified_gmt":"2018-05-31T05:56:49","slug":"mihai-melintei-dimensiunea-geostrategica-a-diferendului-transnistrean","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/mihai-melintei-dimensiunea-geostrategica-a-diferendului-transnistrean\/","title":{"rendered":"Mihai Melintei: Dimensiunea geostrategic\u0103 a diferendului transnistrean"},"content":{"rendered":"

Transnistria \u00eencepe s\u0103 capete o form\u0103 de importan\u021b\u0103 major\u0103 pentru comunitatea interna\u021bional\u0103. R\u0103m\u00e2ne a fi un exemplu al existen\u021bei unei entit\u0103\u021bi statale de facto cu o situa\u021bie regional\u0103 mereu schimb\u0103toare. Constante r\u0103m\u00e2n statutul s\u0103u nerecunoscut \u0219i procesul de negocieri, iar situa\u021bia din interiorul republicii r\u0103m\u00e2ne a fi ambigu\u0103. Compar\u00e2nd situa\u021bia Transnistriei cu cea din Abhazia \u0219i Osetia de Sud, unde un conflict este imposibil, pentru c\u0103 securitatea acestor republici autoproclamate este asigurat\u0103 de F. Rus\u0103, atunci \u00een Transnistria prezen\u021ba trupelor militare ruse\u0219ti GOTR, ridic\u0103 brusc poten\u021bialul opera\u021biunilor militare. Cu toate acestea, dezghe\u021barea conflictului transnistrean al\u0103turi de situa\u021bia din Donbas (Ucraina), amenin\u021b\u0103 cu un mare r\u0103zboi \u00een Europa de Sud-Est. \u00cen aceste condi\u021bii, Moscova, Washingtonul \u0219i Berlinul g\u0103sesc numitori comuni \u00een stoparea escalad\u0103rii unui conflict, \u00eencuraj\u00e2nd procesul de negocieri \u00eentre Chi\u0219in\u0103u \u0219i Tiraspol.<\/p>\n

Prin urmare, problema prezen\u021bei militare ruse\u0219ti \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103 a R. Moldova, r\u0103m\u00e2ne a fi esen\u021bial\u0103 pentru reglementarea problemei transnistrene. Trupele ruse de men\u021binere a p\u0103cii din Transnistria sunt percepute de societatea transnistrean\u0103 ca unicul garant al securit\u0103\u021bii, dup\u0103 cum se afirm\u0103 \u00een sursele de informa\u021bie transnistrene, iar rezultatele ultimului referendum arat\u0103 c\u0103 majoritatea popula\u021biei Transnistriei este \u00eempotriva retragerii contingentelor miliatare ruse\u0219ti de pe teritoriul republicii. \u00cens\u0103, opinia Transnistriei, pu\u021bin probabil c\u0103 joac\u0103 un rol \u00een rezolvarea acestei probleme. Uniunea European\u0103 \u0219i SUA \u00eencearc\u0103 s\u0103 progreseze procesul de implementare de c\u0103tre F. Rus\u0103 a deciziilor de la summit-ul OSCE de la Istanbul (1999) privind retragerea trupelor ruse\u0219ti din Transnistria. Data final\u0103 a retragerii a fost stabilit\u0103 la 31 decembrie 2002.[1]<\/a> \u00cens\u0103, F. Rus\u0103 \u00ee\u0219i exprim\u0103 \u00eengrijorarea fa\u021b\u0103 de ofensiva NATO c\u0103tre est \u0219i nu se gr\u0103be\u0219te s\u0103-\u0219i retrag\u0103 trupele. Aici intervine realpolitikul defensiv al F. Ruse, al c\u0103rui fondator este considerat Evghenii Primakov,\u00a0 care \u00een anul 2000 a fost numit de c\u0103tre pre\u0219edintele F. Ruse, Vladimir Putin, drept pre\u0219edintele Comisiei de stat pentru reglementarea politic\u0103 a conflictului transnistrean.[2]<\/a> Din perspectiva defensiv\u0103, reali\u0219tii din F. Rus\u0103 sus\u021bin ideea de a men\u021bine sfera de influen\u021b\u0103 a F. Ruse \u00een teritoriile fostei URSS. Factorul catalizator al acestei pozi\u021bii defensive a fost l\u0103rgirea NATO spre grani\u021bele F. Ruse.<\/p>\n

O pozi\u021bie interesant\u0103 o are Ucraina \u00een aceast\u0103 situa\u021bie. Autorit\u0103\u021bile ucrainene sus\u021bin tot mai mult schimb\u0103rile procesului de men\u021binere a p\u0103cii \u00een Transnistria; mai mult de at\u00e2t, sunt gata s\u0103 ofere un \u201ecoridor verde\u201d pentru retragere trupelor ruse\u0219ti. Ucraina sper\u0103 prin acest mod s\u0103 primeasc\u0103 o \u0219ans\u0103 real\u0103 din partea partenerilor Occidentali de a-\u0219i ridica statutul s\u0103u \u00een regiune \u0219i de a-\u0219i exercita o influen\u021b\u0103 decisiv\u0103 asupra situa\u021biei din imediata vecin\u0103tate a grani\u021belor sale. \u00cens\u0103, situa\u021bia de criz\u0103 a politicii interne din Ucraina creeaz\u0103 destul de multe dificult\u0103\u021bi. Mai mult de at\u00e2t, pozi\u021bia din prezent a Kievului se contrazice cu statutul s\u0103u de garant \u00een procesul de reglementare pa\u0219nic\u0103 a conflictului transnistrean \u0219i de mediator \u00een formatul de negocieri. Dac\u0103, p\u00e2n\u0103 \u00een 2014 Kievul sprijinea doar diplomatic Chi\u0219in\u0103ul \u0219i participa la misiunea EUBAM, \u00een prezent acesta particip\u0103 direct \u00een problema transnistrean\u0103. \u00centr-un oarecare mod, Ucraina s-a discreditat complet ca pe un mediator \u0219i a luat partea unei p\u0103r\u021bi din conflict, realiz\u00e2nd-u\u0219i interesele personale pe plan regional. \u00cen contextul crizei ucrainene \u0219i al confrunt\u0103rii ruso-ucrainene \u00een domeniul informa\u021biilor, Kievul vede Transnistria drept un \u201eal doilea front ruso-ucrainean\u201d.<\/p>\n

Transnistria \u0219i Federa\u021bia Rus\u0103 iau \u00een considerare \u00eencerc\u0103rile Ucrainei \u0219i R. Moldova de a restr\u00e2nge influen\u021ba rus\u0103 din regiune \u0219i de\u00a0 retragere a trupelor ruse, drept o ac\u021biune neprietenoas\u0103, care submineaz\u0103 fundamentele unei opera\u021biuni de men\u021binere a p\u0103cii.<\/p>\n

O \u00eencercare de lichidare a prezen\u021bei militare ruse\u0219ti din Transnistria este \u00eenso\u021bit\u0103 de o blocad\u0103 economic\u0103. \u00cen acest sens, Transnistria, a c\u0103rei economie este orientat\u0103 spre export, depinde \u00een \u00eentregime de voin\u021ba politic\u0103 a R. Moldova \u0219i Ucrainei. De la \u00eenceputul anului 2014, se observ\u0103 o sincronizare\u00a0 a ac\u021biunilor Chi\u0219in\u0103ului \u0219i Kievului cu privire la\u00a0 controlul comun al frontierei pe segmentul transnistrean, \u00een primul r\u00e2nd pentru fluxul m\u0103rfurilor de export (vezi Acordul dintre Guvernul R. Moldova \u0219i Cabinetul de Mini\u0219tri al Ucrainei privind controlul \u00een comun al persoanelor, mijloacelor de transport \u0219i a m\u0103rfurilor \u00een punctele de trecere comune la frontiera de stat moldo-ucrainean\u0103[3]<\/a>, promulgat de pre\u0219edintele Ucrainei, P. Poro\u0219enko \u00een 12 aprilie 2018[4]<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Este foarte important \u0219i contextul geopolitic al evenimentelor din regiune.\u00a0 Procesul de formare a unei noi \u201ebuffer zone\u201d \u00eentre cele dou\u0103 mari proiecte de integrare (Occidental \u0219i Eurasiatic) a crescut vizibil \u00een regiune. Dac\u0103, vom analiza esen\u021ba lucrurilor vom observa c\u0103 activitatea natural\u0103 a R. Moldova \u0219i Ucrainei pentru economia mondial\u0103 \u0219i dezvoltarea unor zone de liber schimb c\u0103tre vest sau est a dus la o rivalitate geopolitic\u0103 \u00een regiune, iar Transnistria joac\u0103 un rol important \u00een aceast\u0103 rivalitate, pentru c\u0103 reprezint\u0103 o \u201ezon\u0103 de influen\u021b\u0103\u201d.<\/p>\n

Al\u0103turi de al\u021bi actori geopolitici, SUA nu ignor\u0103 problema transnistrean\u0103. La 3 iulie 2014, Senatul SUA a adoptat \u00een a doua lectur\u0103 Legea Nr. 2277, \u201eActul privind prevenirea agresiunii din partea F. Ruse din 2014\u201d<\/em>.[5]<\/a> Prin acest Act, Ucraina, Georgia \u0219i R. Moldova au primit statutul de alia\u021bi ai SUA (vezi Titlul III, sec. 303 \u00een textul Actului). \u00cen data de 21 mai 2015, congressman-ul Joseph R. Pitts, a prezentat o declara\u021bie \u00een care se afirm\u0103 c\u0103 prezen\u021ba trupelor militare ruse\u0219ti \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103 \u00eencalc\u0103 suveranitatea R. Moldova \u0219i este contrar\u0103 principiilor adoptate la Summit-ul de la Istanbul din 1999. Mai mult de at\u00e2t, \u00een textul declara\u021biei se remarc\u0103 faptul c\u0103 F. Rus\u0103 continu\u0103 s\u0103 foloseasc\u0103 prezen\u021ba militar\u0103 al\u0103turi de exportul de gaz\u00a0 \u0219i activele sale de informa\u021bii de pe teritoriul R. Moldova, drept\u00a0 instrumente de destabilizare a regiunii (vezi textul declara\u021biei, alineatul 5)[6]<\/a>. \u00cen luna februarie 2018, Camera Reprezentan\u021bilor a Congresului SUA a adoptat \u00een sesiunea a 2-a, Rezolu\u021bia H.RES.745 \u201ecu privire la intensificarea rela\u021biilor cu R. Moldova \u0219i sus\u021binerea integrit\u0103\u021bii teritoriale a R. Moldova\u201d<\/em>. Punctul 9 \u0219i 10 din decizia Congresului se refer\u0103 din noua la retragerea trupelor ruse din Transnistria. De asemenea, SUA \u00ee\u0219i asum\u0103 angajamentul de a activiza procesul de negociere \u00een formatul \u201e5+2\u201d, punctul 11.[7]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u00cen toate aceste demersuri ale Congresului SUA, Federa\u021biei Ruse \u00eei este recomandat s\u0103 se ab\u021bin\u0103 de la presiuni economice asupra R. Moldova, s\u0103 opreasc\u0103 sus\u021binerea mi\u0219c\u0103rii separatiste \u0219i s\u0103-\u0219i \u00eendeplineasc\u0103 angajamentele anterioare cu privire la retragerea trupelor militare \u0219i al armamentului din regiunea transnistrean\u0103. Aceast\u0103 aten\u021bie sporit\u0103 a SUA arat\u0103 c\u0103 regiunea devine un element important al luptei globale a marilor for\u021be geopolitice. Pentru regiune acest a priori <\/em>(efect) implic\u0103 riscuri serioase.<\/p>\n

Din punct de vedere geopolitic, ac\u021biunile Kievului (concretizabile \u00een atragerea F. Ruse \u00eentr-un r\u0103zboi) sunt \u00een avantajul SUA, iar numirea \u00een luna mai 2015 a lui M. Saakashvili ca guvernator al regiunii Odesa (Ucraina) a fost o davad\u0103 a acestui fapt. Deci, situa\u021bia din regiune indic\u0103 apari\u021bia unor noi provoc\u0103ri \u0219i amenin\u021b\u0103ri. Al\u0103turi de criza din regiunile sud-estice ale Ucrainei, situa\u021bia din jurul grani\u021bei segmentului transnistrean se poate \u00eenr\u0103ut\u0103\u021bi, indiferent de prezen\u021ba pacificatorilor \u00een zona de securitate. Cu toate acestea, F. Rus\u0103, care sprijin\u0103 politic \u0219i diplomatic Tiraspolul, evit\u0103 \u00een orice mod, dezghe\u021barea conflictului regional.<\/p>\n

\u00cen continuare, folosind analiza SWOT, vom identifica unele aspecte critice, respectiv, vom prognoza unele etape incipiente. Analiza SWOT consist\u0103 \u00een identificarea \u015fi extragerea aspectelor esen\u0163iale ale problemei, respectiv organizarea acestora pe urm\u0103toarele dimensiuni: Strenghts (punctele tari), Weaknesses (punctele slabe), Opportunities (oportunit\u0103\u021bi), Threats (amenin\u021b\u0103ri).<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Factori<\/strong><\/td>\nPunctele Tari (S)<\/strong><\/td>\nPunctele slabe (W)<\/strong><\/td>\nOportunit\u0103\u021bi (O)<\/strong><\/td>\nAmenin\u021b\u0103ri (T)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Geografia<\/strong><\/td>\nPozi\u021bie geografic\u0103 avantajoas\u0103, teritoriul transnistrean este situat la intersec\u021bia rutelor de transport energetic de la est la vest. R. Moldova import\u0103 produse petroliere prin frontiera de est, punctul vamal Bender \u2013 2.[8]<\/a><\/td>\nRegiunea transnistrean\u0103 este izolat\u0103 de teritoriul F. Ruse, neav\u00e2nd o leg\u0103tur\u0103 direct\u0103 cu frontiera acesteia.<\/td>\nTranzitul materiei energetice. Dispune de o siguran\u021b\u0103 energetic\u0103.<\/p>\n

Din punct de vedere geostrategic are un rol de avantpost.<\/td>\n

Blocad\u0103 economic\u0103. R. Moldova poate stopa importul produselor petroliere, dezvolt\u00e2nd alte c\u0103i de transport energetic.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Capacitatea industrial\u0103<\/strong><\/td>\nTransnistria dispune de un complex industrial, Centrala Electric\u0103 de la Cuciurgan, Uzina Metalurgic\u0103 de la R\u00eebni\u021ba, Combinatul de ciment de la R\u00eebni\u021ba, Tirotext (produc\u0103tor de textile).<\/td>\nDependen\u021ba economiei Transnistriei fa\u021b\u0103 de veniturile companiilor industriale.<\/p>\n

Capacitatea produsului industrial al Transnistriei depinde de pia\u021ba R. Moldova.<\/td>\n

Export de produse primare, care aduc venit \u00een economie.<\/p>\n

Dezvoltarea unei infrastructuri industriale durabile.<\/td>\n

Suspendarea\u00a0 activit\u0103\u021bii unei companii duce la \u201ecolapsul\u201d \u00eentregii industrii.<\/p>\n

\u00cen cazul c\u00e2nd cerearea de produs scade, economia regiunii sufer\u0103.<\/p>\n

Deficit comercial.<\/p>\n

 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

Preg\u0103tirea militar\u0103<\/strong><\/td>\n\u00cen Transnistria recru\u021bii \u00eendeplinesc serviciul militar obligatoriu (armat\u0103 proprie).<\/p>\n

Unele complexe industriale produc armament \u0219i muni\u021bie militar\u0103.[9]<\/a><\/p>\n

Prezen\u021ba militar\u0103 a trupelor F. Ruse (GOTR).<\/td>\n

Sistemul militar este grav afectat de sustragerea \u00een mas\u0103 a tinerilor de la \u00eencorporare.<\/p>\n

Numeroase dezert\u0103ri.<\/td>\n

Dispune de capacitate organizatoric\u0103 militar\u0103 supradimensionat\u0103 fa\u021b\u0103 de necisit\u0103\u021bi. Prezen\u021ba militar\u0103 ruseasc\u0103 \u00eei confer\u0103 un scop de ofensiv\u0103 \u0219i o superioritate militar\u0103 fa\u021b\u0103 de statele vecine.<\/p>\n

 <\/td>\n

\u00cen contextul crizei din Ucraina, poten\u021bialul militar al Transnistriei poate efectua opera\u021biuni de ofensiv\u0103 spre direc\u021bia Chilia \u2013 Odesa.<\/p>\n

 <\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

Calitatea guvern\u0103rii<\/strong><\/td>\nNoua administra\u021bie de la Tiraspol particip\u0103 activ la procesul de negocieri. Cu toate acestea, liderul de la Tiraspol sus\u021bine ideile referendumului din 2006.<\/p>\n

A \u00eenceput s\u0103 fie implementat\u0103 o reform\u0103 \u00een sistemul administrativ.<\/td>\n

Dependen\u021ba de sistemul politic al F. Ruse.<\/p>\n

Interdependen\u021ba guvern\u0103rii de oligarhii regionali.<\/p>\n

 <\/td>\n

Activizarea dialogului cu R. Moldova \u0219i UE. Primul dialog de cooperare al exper\u021bilor din domeniul bancar.<\/p>\n

Oligarhii \u0219i Holdingul Sheriff sunt atra\u0219i de benificiile acordului de asociere cu UE.<\/p>\n

 <\/td>\n

Declararea suveranit\u0103\u021bii \u0219i alipirea la F. Rus\u0103.<\/p>\n

Destabilizarea social-economic\u0103 a regiunii.<\/p>\n

Apari\u021bia unor programe politice radicale.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

Calitatea diploma\u021biei<\/strong><\/td>\nDiploma\u021bii transnistreni particip\u0103 la platformele interna\u021bionale de discu\u021bie din Europa \u0219i F. Rus\u0103.<\/p>\n

Este \u00eenregistrat un progres \u00een dialogul reprezentan\u021bilor politici din partea R. Moldova \u0219i Transnistriei.<\/p>\n

Diploma\u021bii ambelor p\u0103r\u021bi colaboreaz\u0103 \u00een diferite domenii (vezi protocoalele semnate \u00een ultimele 6 luni[10]<\/a>,[11]<\/a>,[12]<\/a>).<\/td>\n

Constr\u00e2ngerea geopolitic\u0103 e regiunii \u0219i dependen\u021ba de factorul rusesc.<\/p>\n

Nu se discut\u0103 statutul regiunii \u00een cadrul platformelor de discu\u021bie la nivel interna\u021bional.<\/td>\n

Implementarea unor reforme interne \u0219i externe benefice popula\u021biei din st\u00e2nga Nistrului.<\/p>\n

 <\/td>\n

Etape ofensive unilateriale, care pot agrava dialogul cu R. Moldova \u0219i procesul de negocieri \u00een formatul \u201e5+2\u201d.<\/p>\n

Blocarea procesului de negocieri.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

 <\/p>\n

Prin acest tip de analiz\u0103 putem observa c\u0103 Transnistria are mai multe probleme fundamentale, dar totodat\u0103 dispune \u0219i de un \u0219ir de instrumente oportune, care pot schimba \u00een orice moment situa\u021bia geopolitic\u0103 \u0219i geostrategic\u0103 din regiune. Desigur c\u0103, situa\u021bia geopolitic\u0103 din regiune s-a modificat mult dup\u0103 anexarea Crimeii \u00een anul 2014.[13]<\/a> Importan\u021ba strategico-militar\u0103 a regiunii transnistrene a preluat un alt sens dup\u0103 evenimentele din Ucraina din martie 2014. Av\u00e2nd \u00een vedere lipsa unei frontiere comune \u00eentre F. Rus\u0103 \u0219i Transnistria, Moscova este limitat\u0103 \u00een ac\u021biunile sale de securizare a Transnistriei. Cu toate acestea, renun\u021barea la Transnistria \u00eenseamn\u0103, \u00een mod inevitabil, o cre\u0219tere a presiunii occidentale \u00een direc\u021bia Crimeii \u0219i Donbasului, iar acest efect poate conduce la consecin\u021be imprevizibile \u00een regiune, inclusiv, casus belli.<\/em> Escaladarea conflictului poate avea loc \u00een orice moment. Lu\u00e2nd \u00een considerare c\u0103 ad\u00e2ncimea maxim\u0103 a zonelor de ap\u0103rare a Transnistriei atinge, aproximativ, 20 \u2013 30 km, iar \u00een regiunea a trei istmuri tactice (comunele Ra\u0219cov, Jurca, Novovladimirovca) este de 4 \u2013 5 km, aceasta \u00eenseamn\u0103 c\u0103 \u0219i sec\u021biunile centrale ale Transnistriei se afl\u0103 \u00eentr-o raz\u0103 de \u00eenfr\u00e2ngere a artileriei For\u021belor Armate din R. Moldova \u0219i Ucraina. \u00cempotriva for\u021belor militare transnistrenen pot fi folosite zeci de vehicule de lupt\u0103 BMD – 1, BM \u2013 21 \u201eGrad\u201d, BM \u2013 27 \u201eUragan\u201d, tunuri obuziere 2S9 \u201eAnona\u201d, D \u2013 30, (aflate \u00een dotarea Armatei Na\u021bionale a R. Moldova)[14]<\/a>, care pot \u00eenconjura regiunea transnistrean\u0103 \u00eentr-un inel str\u00e2ns de pe teritoriul R. Moldova \u0219i Ucrainei. For\u021bele Armate ale R. Moldova dispun, de asemenea, de tunuri tractate 2A36, cu lungimea de 152 mm., capabile s\u0103 trag\u0103 la o distan\u021b\u0103 de 33,5 km. (pentru o analiz\u0103 comparativ\u0103 vezi efectivul militar al R. Moldova \u00een zona de conflict din anul 1992).[15]<\/a> Tiraspolul, totu\u0219i, va fi capabil s\u0103 riposteze, av\u00e2nd la dispozi\u021bie aproximativ o sut\u0103 de vehicule de lupt\u0103 BM \u2013 21 \u201eGrad\u201d, 30 de tunuri antitanc de 100 de milimetri de tip 2A29, \u0219i tunuri tractate D-44 de 85 milimetri cu raza de tragere 16 km., precum \u0219i un num\u0103r mare de sisteme antirachet\u0103 \u0219i RPG-uri[16]<\/a>.\u00a0 GOTR reprezint\u0103 la momentul de fa\u021b\u0103 un atu tactic al F. Ruse \u00een regiune, dar totu\u0219i, R. Moldova folose\u0219te unele instrumente pentru complicarea procesului de rota\u021bie a grup\u0103rii ruse alc\u0103tuite din 1412 solda\u021bi. Un moment important \u0219i ofensiv \u00eel constituie \u0219i ac\u021biunile Kievului, care \u0219i-a amplasat \u00een distrinctul Odesa \u00een apropierea estuarului Nistru, noi sisteme de rachete sol \u2013 aer S300PS (Cod NATO \u2013 SA10 Grumble).[17]<\/a> Complexele ucrainene acoper\u0103 \u00een totalitate toate liniile de est de trecere c\u0103tre Transnistria a spa\u021biului aerian de deasupra M\u0103rii Negre. \u00cen aceast\u0103 situa\u021bie, un rol cheie pentru Transnistria \u00eel joac\u0103 Flota Maritim\u0103 Militar\u0103 Rus\u0103 din Marea Neagr\u0103 (vezi dotarea \u00een surs\u0103[18]<\/a>). De asemenea, se pot desf\u0103\u0219ura opera\u021biuni aeriene din partea Tiraspolului cu ajutorul F. Ruse, pentru deschiderea coridorului aerian de deasupra Transnistirei. Pentru acest scop va fi folosit regimentul de avia\u021bie dislocat \u00een Crimeea la baza aerian\u0103 Belbek, dotat cu avioane de lupt\u0103 multirol Su \u2013 27 (Cod NATO \u2013 Flanker-B).[19]<\/a> O astfel de situa\u021bie poate provoca un conflict armat direct propor\u021bional cu criza din Ucraina (Donbas), cresc\u00e2nd probabilitatea unui casus foederis<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Cu privire la GOTR, Rada Suprem\u0103 a Ucrainei a anun\u021bat dizolvarea unor acorduri privind cooperarea militar\u0103 cu F. Rus\u0103.[20]<\/a> Printre acestea se afl\u0103 \u0219i acordul cu privire la tranzitul de m\u0103rfuri militare \u00een Transnistria. \u00cen acela\u0219i timp, R. Moldova a \u00een\u0103sprit regimul de trecere a solda\u021bilor ru\u0219i prin aeroportul de la Chi\u0219in\u0103u. Din punct de vedere militar GOTR, ast\u0103zi reprezint\u0103 un obstacol serios pentru orice armat\u0103 din regiune. Un atac \u00eempotriva for\u021belor armate ale Rusiei \u00eenseamn\u0103 un r\u0103spuns inevitabil, drept exemplu, incidentul din 8 august 2008 (Georgia)[21]<\/a>. \u00cen prezent, tranzitul personalului militar rus spre Transnistria func\u021bioneaz\u0103 doar \u00eentr-o singur\u0103 direc\u021bie, cei care merg spre F. Rus\u0103 sunt liberi s\u0103 treac\u0103 frontiera, iar cei care vin pentru serviciu militar \u00een GOTR, nu sunt admi\u0219i la frontier\u0103. Putem prevedea \u0219i aici un scenariu, lu\u00e2nd \u00een considerare metodele militare de livrare a muni\u021biei \u0219i a personalului militar. Din punct de vedere tehnic, nu sunt probleme, avioanele Il \u2013 76 (Cod NATO – Candid) pot \u00eendeplini aceste opera\u021biuni s\u0103pt\u0103m\u00e2nal, iar din punct de vedere al dreptului interna\u021bional, un avion care apare f\u0103r\u0103 permisiune pe radarele unui spa\u021biu aerian este o \u021bint\u0103 militar\u0103 legitim\u0103.<\/p>\n

Gradul de confruntare \u00een jurul Transnistriei poate cre\u0219te foarte rapid \u0219i puternic pe diferite dimensiuni \u0219i niveluri. \u00centrebarea este, c\u00e2t de departe, p\u0103r\u021bile, sunt gata s\u0103 intre \u00een aceast\u0103 confruntare.<\/p>\n

Cu toate acestea, rela\u021biile dintre Chi\u0219in\u0103u \u0219i Tiraspol au dob\u00e2ndit recent un nou caracter, elimin\u00e2nd stereotipurile de ostilitate reciproc\u0103. Mediatorii \u0219i observatorii \u00een procesul de negociere privind reglementarea transnistrean\u0103 iau \u00een considerare \u0219i remarc\u0103 progrese notabile. Negociatorii ambelor p\u0103r\u021bi colaboreaz\u0103 pe diferite domenii \u00een interesul cet\u0103\u021benilor ambelor maluri ale Nistrului, \u00eens\u0103, evit\u0103 \u00een mod tacit discu\u021biile cu privire la viitorul statut al republicii, una din problemele cheie a reglement\u0103rii transnistrene.<\/p>\n

Modificarea ordinii interna\u021bionale \u0219i schimbarea echilibrului de for\u021be \u00een regiune, dar \u0219i confruntarea tendin\u021belor de globalizare cu consolidarea frontierelor na\u021bionale conduc \u00een mod firesc ca toate p\u0103r\u021bile s\u0103 fie interesate s\u0103 rezolve diferendumul transnistrean. \u00cens\u0103, ca \u0219i \u00een alte p\u0103r\u021bi ale lumii, exist\u0103 for\u021be interesate de existen\u021ba unor \u201ezone gri\u201d. Acest lucru este o chestiune complet diferit\u0103 de un proces de negociere cu intermediari, garan\u021bi \u0219i observatori. Orice op\u021biune luat\u0103 \u00een considerare \u00een cadrul procesului de reglementare a problemei transnistrene nu este acceptat de una dintre\u00a0 sau de for\u021bele din spatele ei. Astfel c\u0103, r\u0103m\u00e2ne s\u0103 se bazeze numai pe scheme de compromis. \u00cen acela\u0219i timp, cultura politic\u0103 a tuturor p\u0103r\u021bilor implicate \u00een procesul de reglementare ar trebuie s\u0103 devin\u0103 principala garan\u021bie a succesului.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Referin\u021be:<\/em><\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> OSCE, Istanbul Document, <\/em>19.11.1999, in https:\/\/www.osce.org\/mc\/39569<\/a>, pp. 49-50 (19) english version.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> \u041f\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438, \u0412\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0438\u043c\u0438\u0440 \u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043d\u044f\u043b \u0440\u0443\u043a\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f \u0434\u0443\u043c\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0444\u0440\u0430\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u00ab\u041e\u0442\u0435\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u2013 \u0432\u0441\u044f \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044f\u00bb \u0415\u0432\u0433\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u041f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430<\/em>, 03.07.2000, \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u0432\u0430, \u041a\u0440\u0435\u043c\u043b\u044c, \u0432 http:\/\/kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/38332<\/a> (07.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Guvernul Republicii Moldova, Hot\u0103r\u00eere Nr. 901, <\/em>din 06.11.2017, Publicat: 10.11.2017 \u00een Monitorul Oficial Nr. 390-395, \u00een http:\/\/lex.justice.md\/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=372414<\/a> (08.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> \u0412\u0435\u0440\u0445\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0430 \u0420\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u00ef\u043d\u0438, \u0417\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u00ef\u043d\u0438 \u00ab\u041f\u0440\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0456\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0456\u044e \u0423\u0433\u043e\u0434\u0438 \u043c\u0456\u0436 \u041a\u0430\u0431\u0456\u043d\u0435\u0442\u043e\u043c \u041c\u0456\u043d\u0456\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0456\u0432 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u0442\u0430 \u0423\u0440\u044f\u0434\u043e\u043c \u0420\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0456\u043a\u0438 \u041c\u043e\u043b\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e \u0441\u043f\u0456\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0442\u0440\u043e\u043b\u044c \u043e\u0441\u0456\u0431, \u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0441\u043f\u043e\u0440\u0442\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u0437\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0431\u0456\u0432, \u0442\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0440\u0456\u0432 \u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u043c\u0435\u0442\u0456\u0432 \u0443 \u0441\u043f\u0456\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0442\u0430\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0443\u0441\u043a\u0443 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u0443\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e-\u043c\u043e\u043b\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u0440\u0434\u043e\u043d\u00bb<\/em>,\u00a0 01.03.2018, \u0432 http:\/\/zakon5.rada.gov.ua\/laws\/show\/2317-19<\/a> (08.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Congress, S.2277 – Russian Aggression Prevention Act of 2014<\/em>, 05.01.2014, in https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/bill\/113th-congress\/senate-bill\/2277\/text#toc-id1ae6b2183f314e9facb8f2bbe5480117<\/a>\u00a0 (08.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Congress, Congressional Moldova Caucus Statement On The Riga Summit<\/em>,\u00a0 21.05.2015, in https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/congressional-record\/2015\/5\/21\/extensions-of-remarks-section\/article\/E779-3<\/a> (08.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Congress, H.Res.745 – Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with respect to enhanced relations with the Republic of Moldova and support for Moldova’s territorial integrity, <\/em>20.02.2018, in https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/bill\/115th-congress\/house-resolution\/745\/text<\/a> (08.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> Guvernul R. Moldova, Guvernul a extins termenul de introducere a produselor petroliere prin frontiera de est a Republicii Moldova p\u00e2n\u0103 la 01 iulie 2018<\/em>, 01.11.2018, \u00een https:\/\/gov.md\/ro\/content\/guvernul-extins-termenul-de-introducere-produselor-petroliere-prin-frontiera-de-est-1<\/a> (08.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> Eugen Str\u0103u\u021biu, For\u021bele militare \u00een regiunea transnistrean\u0103. Evalu\u0103ri cantitative \u015fi calitative<\/em>, \u00een \u201eLACT\u201d, 10.02.2015, \u00a0https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/2015\/02\/10\/eugen-strautiu-fortele-militare-in-regiunea-transnistreana-evaluari-cantitative-si-calitative\/<\/a> (14.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Anuarul Laboratorului pentru Analiza Conflictul Transnistrean, Documente<\/em>, V.I, Nr.1, Sibiu, 2017, pp. 265 \u2013 276.<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> LACT, Decizie de Protocol cu privire la mecanismul de interac\u021biune \u00een domeniul veterinar, carantin\u0103 \u0219i protec\u021bia plantelor<\/em>,\u00a0 16.02.2018, \u00een https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/2018\/02\/16\/decizie-de-protocol-cu-privire-la-mecanismul-de-interactiune-in-domeniul-veterinar\/<\/a> (15.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> LACT, Decizia Protocolar\u0103 privind participarea mijloacelor de transport din Transnistria, care nu desf\u0103\u0219oar\u0103 activit\u0103\u021bi comerciale, \u00een traficul rutier international<\/em>, 25.04.2018, \u00een https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/2018\/04\/25\/decizia-protocolara-privind-participarea-mijloacelor-de-transport-din-transnistria-care-nu-desfasoara-activitati-comerciale-in-traficul-rutier-international\/<\/a> (15.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> \u0418\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0444\u0430\u043a\u0441, \u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c \u0432\u043e\u0448\u0435\u043b \u0432 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438<\/em>, 18.03.2014, \u0432 http:\/\/www.interfax.ru\/russia\/365492<\/a> (15.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Stela Mihailovici, Dotare, curios: Cu ce se ap\u0103r\u0103 R. Moldova \u00een caz de invazie militar\u0103?, <\/em>\u00een \u201eZiarul Na\u021bional\u201d, 28.02.2015, http:\/\/www.ziarulnational.md\/dotare-curios-cu-ce-se-apara-r-moldova-in-caz-de-invazie-militara\/<\/a> (15.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> Ion Costa\u0219, Transnistria 1989 \u2013 1992, cronica unui r\u0103zboi \u201enedeclarat\u201d, <\/em>Ed. RAO, Bucure\u0219ti, 2012, pp. 640-641.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> \u0420\u0418\u0410 \u041d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u0413\u0443\u0441\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0447\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0411\u0422\u0420 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435 \u043c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0430\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0438 \u041f\u041c\u0420<\/em>, 28.08.2015, \u0432 https:\/\/ria.ru\/world\/20150828\/1213487219.html<\/a> (16.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> TCH \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u0430, \u041e\u0434\u0435\u0441\u0441\u043a\u0430\u044f \u0420\u0430\u043a\u0435\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0411\u0440\u0438\u0433\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u041f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u043b\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0412\u043e\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041c\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0417\u0420\u041a \u0421-300\u041f\u0421<\/em>, 17.10.2016, \u0432 \u00a0https:\/\/ru.tsn.ua\/ukrayina\/odesskaya-raketnaya-brigada-poluchila-na-vooruzhenie-modernizirovannyy-zrk-s-300ps-730406.html<\/a> (16.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> \u0422\u0410\u0421\u0421, \u0411\u043e\u0435\u0432\u044b\u0435 \u041a\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0431\u043b\u0438 \u0412\u041c\u0424 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438: \u0427\u0435\u0440\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0440\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0424\u043b\u043e\u0442, <\/em>\u0432 http:\/\/vmf-rf.tass.ru\/black-sea\/<\/a> (16.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> \u041c\u0438\u043d\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u041e\u0431\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043d\u044b \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438, \u041a\u043e\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0439 \u0432\u043e\u0439\u0441\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u042e\u0412\u041e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0438\u043b \u0431\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0443\u044e \u0433\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0430\u0432\u0438\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u043e\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f 4-\u0439 \u0430\u0440\u043c\u0438\u0438 \u0412\u0412\u0421 \u0438 \u041f\u0412\u041e \u0432 \u041a\u0440\u044b\u043c\u0443<\/em>, 06.06.2017, \u0432 https:\/\/function.mil.ru\/news_page\/country\/more.htm?id=12127258@egNews<\/a> (16.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[20]<\/a> \u0412\u0435\u0440\u0445\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0420\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u044b, \u0412\u0435\u0440\u0445\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0420\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u044b \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043d\u044f\u043b\u0430 \u0440\u044f\u0434 \u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0432 \u043e \u0434\u0435\u043d\u043e\u043d\u0441\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0441\u043e\u0433\u043b\u0430\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043c\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0443 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u043c \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0438\u043d\u044b \u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u043c \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438<\/em>, 21.05.2015, \u0432 http:\/\/rada.gov.ua\/ru\/news\/Novosty\/Soobshchenyya\/109926.html<\/a> (16.05.2018).<\/p>\n

[21]<\/a> \u0420\u0418\u0410 \u041d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u0425\u0440\u043e\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u0432\u043e\u043e\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043d\u0444\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0442\u0430 \u0432 \u042e\u0436\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u041e\u0441\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0438 \u0432 \u0430\u0432\u0433\u0443\u0441\u0442\u0435 2008 \u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430<\/em>, 08.08.2013, \u0432 https:\/\/ria.ru\/spravka\/20130808\/954669079.html<\/a> (16.05.2018).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Transnistria \u00eencepe s\u0103 capete o form\u0103 de importan\u021b\u0103 major\u0103 pentru comunitatea interna\u021bional\u0103. R\u0103m\u00e2ne a fi un exemplu al existen\u021bei unei entit\u0103\u021bi statale de facto cu o situa\u021bie regional\u0103 mereu schimb\u0103toare. Constante r\u0103m\u00e2n statutul s\u0103u nerecunoscut \u0219i procesul de negocieri, iar situa\u021bia din interiorul republicii r\u0103m\u00e2ne a fi ambigu\u0103. Compar\u00e2nd situa\u021bia Transnistriei cu cea din Abhazia…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[7],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4856"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4856"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4856\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4858,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4856\/revisions\/4858"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4856"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4856"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/centers.ulbsibiu.ro\/ccsprise\/lact\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4856"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}