The grey cardinal of Moldovan politics Vlad Plahotniuc rarely appears in public. But last year stakes have been getting high for him, so he dares to do it more actively now. Thus the America-based top-rated media Politico published on October, 2 an article under his name entitled “Moldova belongs in the European Union, now more than ever”.
At first sight the article does not pretend to be outstanding. US has become one of the major places where current Moldovan politics is playing out. After V. Plahotniuc met with Victoria Nuland in May this year and got apparently a verbal support from the official US authorities (despite interests of protest movement in Chisinau), Washington was inundated with lobbying activities of those forces which are determined to dismantle the system of a “captured state” in Moldova. Some of key US mass-media like Washington Post or New York Times published very critical texts about what is happening in Moldova with particular focus on the figure of V. Plahotniuc. He and his team-mates (prime-minister P. Filip and speaker of the Parliament A. Candu) have tried to respond, also by writing articles about how they are committed to the European path of the Republic of Moldova, fight against corruption and fraud which overwhelmed the country. These texts are far from being identical. It could be explained by the fact that they obviously appeared in various contexts and were written probably by various spin doctors who have been actively hired by Plahotniuc for promoting his interests in Bucharest, Brussels and Washington.
The article in Politico also tries to convince the Western audience of the will and progress in making hard reforms, allegedly present on the part of current Moldovan government. In face of coming presidential elections executive coordinator of the Moldovan Government Coalition Council and deputy chairman of the Democratic Party of Moldova (as Vlad Plahotniuc titles himself) argues that these elections presuppose “a choice to make: continue on the path of progress or side with pro-Russian hardliners who question the promises of a free market”. Consequently, the message is that the EU and US should support today’s state of affairs and those who are in power in Moldova. In this regard the fact that US high official Victoria Nuland and the EU Commissioner on European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn recently met with prime-minister Pavel Filip is by itself telling. Notably at the official press-conference when the microphone turned out to be not switched off the EU Commissioner said to the Moldovan head of government about the importance of not letting the early elections happen. Such “agreements” or “messages” would not be possible in the context of mutual hostility or alienation.
But the general support by itself is not the only “should” which the West has to deliver to Moldovan authorities. Plahotniuc argues that “our European allies must understand that we can be pro-Western without being anti-Russian. Moldova wants to work with all of its citizens and neighbors to stabilize the region… Despite the tensions between us, Russia remains Moldova’s second-largest trading partner after the EU. Our countries should continue to discuss how to increase and improve our commercial relations”. It is hardly possible that this message about the normalization of relations with Russia is purely manipulative in the context of political competition with Moldovan pro-Russian “hardliners”. Politico is read first of all by representatives of the Western political elite, not those who would like to vote for Igor Dodon or Renato Usatii.
Apparently Vlad Plahotniuc is aware of eventual sharp reactions from Brussels and Washington on his initiative to rebuild political dialogue and trade relations with Russia on the basis of mutual concessions. Both sides are working in favor of organizing in November 2016 an official meeting of bilateral commission on trade relations to discuss lifting of restrictions on Moldovan import which remain in force since 2013-2014. With this end in view Chisinau is now negotiating with Moscow on a roadmap which Chisinau (as stated not only by Rogozin but also by Vladimir Putin during his recent meeting with Pavel Filip) should coordinate with Brussels. It is well-known that the EU is very critical about any changes to obligations which Moldova took in the context of Association Agreement. One of the main issues there is how to provide a parallel functioning of the EU and CIS technical standards in Moldova and transparency of its (re)export operations for Moscow. Russia demands the full compliance of Moldovan side with CIS Free Trade Area Agreement.
This issue is almost not being covered by experts or mass-media. Only James Pettit, US Ambassador in Moldova, explicitly mentioned it in his recent well-known interview and generally praised the Moldova’s rapprochement with Russia. Little attention is paid to Russian-Moldovan negotiations despite the fact that they can be practically compared with how the EU, Russia and Ukraine discussed the same problem in the trilateral format in 2015 but dramatically failed to reach a compromise. This time Russia insists that Moldova should by itself find a common position with the European Commission. If there have been any negotiations between Moldova and Brussels, the contours of any compromise are still unclear.
There is one more remarkable issue three times mentioned in the Plahotniuc’s article, namely the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. Firstly, it was mentioned in the context of what Russia and Moldova should work on together to guarantee the regional stability. While having in mind that Germany and Russia actively assisted this year the negotiations within 5+2 format paying particular attention to confidence-building measures, the orientation of the Moldovan politician on cooperation with Russia on Transnistria, recently rejected by Moldovan diplomacy, becomes visible. It seems to be particularly important that this argument is not followed in the article by appeals to Russia to withdraw its forces, to stop occupation of Moldova etc. So the approach is quite positive.
And secondly, it is argued that “by achieving a settlement in Transnistria, we would create a model for resolving other “frozen conflicts” that are all too common in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and Central Asia”. The resolution of the Transnistrian conflict is interpreted by the EU as a substantial contribution to European security, also in the context of engaging Russia, and as a prerequisite for Moldova’s Europeanization. Thus Plahotniuc would like to go the same way as Vlad Filat when he was a prime-minister. Filat used to overcome traditional stereotypes relating to Tiraspol and managed to build up a pragmatic dialogue with his Transnistrian counterpart Engeny Shevchuk having achieved with him some important agreements on economic relations between two banks of Nistru river. This process was very positively interpreted in the EU, that’s why Vlad Plahotniuc seems to want repeating this experience. Foreign policy domain with its geopolitical games usually seems to be less challenging than fulfilling the comprehensive reform agenda. Consequently, it is quite predictable that Transnistria is one of the key issues which Vlad Plahotniuc would be willing to discuss with Russia, the West and Transnistria itself after the political situation in Moldova becomes more stable.
We could interpret the article in Politico as a subsequent attempt to look well while the current government in Moldova is accused of almost all failures from which the country is suffering at the moment. But at the same time it also contains some messages to the West and Russia how Vlad Plahotniuc sees his own foreign policy agenda in post-elections period and how this agenda corresponds with the interests of key external actors.