Many right-wing politicians and experts from Moldova used to argue that OSCE is a weak organization which is dominated by Russian interests within the Transnistrian conflict settlement and which contributes to de facto recognition of Transnistrian independence by imposing “5+2” negotiation format on Chisinau.
The visit of Franco Frattini, the former Italian foreign minister, and current Special Representative of the OSCE Presidency, clearly demonstrated the opposite. The concept of how the OSCE Presidency and OSCE Mission, headed by US Ambassador Michael Scanlan, are acting in the Transnistrian issue, reflects the “balance of power” existing in the region. The interests of both global and regional players are considered to a very great extent. One of the key arguments in favor of this idea is that none of the global players participating in the 5+2 format moderated by OSCE (neither Ukraine, nor EU or US) has argued that this negotiation mechanism should be eliminated or transformed.
In its turn, the Moldovan authorities got many political dividends from the visit of Mr. Frattini. Firstly, Vlad Plahotniuc politicized earlier the issue with withdrawal of Russian ammunitions and troops from the left bank, and Mr. Frattini reconfirmed many times during his stay the OSCE position that Moscow should carry out its obligations according to 1999 Istanbul Declaration. Later the media affiliated with the Democratic Party, presented it as a diplomatic victory of the current authorities. Secondly, Mr. Frattini met Mr. Plahotniuc personally, what is unusual for the existing diplomatic practice. Therefore, the status of the leader of the Democratic Party as a key actor of the Moldovan political landscape was accepted. Thirdly, the Moldovan government seems to have managed to promote within the official agenda all its visions concerning the car vehicles plates and freedom of movement, both regarding the creation of a Transnistrian customs point at the bridge Gura Bîcului – Bîcioc and the access of pupils and teachers to the schools with Latin script located on the left bank. It was particularly important that both Frattini and Scanlan argued that Tiraspol and Moscow should deliver in terms of freedom of movement by abstaining from creation of any checkpoints at the bridge.
Transnistria also benefited from the moderation of the Italian diplomat, as well as OSCE and EU in general. Firstly, the OSCE handed over to the military observers in the Security Zone a special equipment which will allow them to better control the situation without a need to create any further checkpoints. Secondly, these were OSCE and EUBAM which insisted on the creation in 2015 of a temporary mechanism for the movement of Transnistrian vehicles on the Moldovan and Ukrainian territory. Now it seems that currently they are promoting a mechanism close to the idea of “neutral” car license plates, which was agreed by Chisinau and Tiraspol in 2013 but was never implemented. Thirdly, OSCE has explicitly supported the Transnistrian initiative on discussing the banking interconnection of both banks. A working group on banking was created last year, and exactly OSCE and EU are pushing Chisinau towards the idea that such a banking agreement would be a fulfillment of Moldova’s obligations according to Basel III Standards confirmed by EU-Moldova Association Agreement.
Frattini and Scanlan spoke about current year as a historical moment for the Transnistrian conflict settlement. Probably it is a too big optimism to argue in this way. What is more realistic is that current OSCE Presidency will somehow manage to keep the agenda of confidence-building measures between Chisinau and Tiraspol by achieving at least two ready-made arrangements, be it until May or later this year. Since the Moldovan ruling coalition has presented the visit of Mr. Frattini in a way very favorable for itself, it is possible that the Moldovan government will afford itself some new agreements with Tiraspol despite of coming parliamentary elections. Besides, the Transnistrian issue is important for the Democratic Party which presents the positive results of negotiations to the West as its own substantial contribution to the regional security.
Most likely these agreements will touch upon the issues of car vehicles plates and opening of the bridge for heavy trucks (it means for the international movement in general). All other issues like conclusion of criminal cases are much more difficult to solve or need a further discussion (like those on telecommunication or banking). But the issues of car vehicle plates and opening of the bridge Gura Bîcului – Bîcioc for heavy trucks seem now to be interlinked: if Moldova, which has been insisting on the full implementation of Vienna Convention of 1968 and its own full jurisdiction over Tiraspol in the transport domain, will withdraw from its tough stance by returning to the idea of “neutral” car plates, Tiraspol could accept the institutional domination of e-system “Registru” and abstain from creating any checkpoints at the bridge.
The fact that both sides are close to the compromise can be identified due to explicit belief of Mr. Scanlan and Mr. Frattini about a possibility to reach it within even not months but weeks. Particularly important would be the resolution on the car vehicle plates because for both sides this agreement is quite sensitive. In this context they should find a solution how to tackle the issue of “sovereignty” properly.
To sum up, in a moment when all actors involved, both at global and regional level, are determined to get some practical results, such results appear and most likely correspond with interests of all parties. The historical role of at least last three OSCE Presidencies is that they have not favored interests of any party and tried to act as “honest brokers”.