On March, 27 Franco Frattini, who is a current Special Representative of OSCE Italian Presidency for Transnistrian conflict settlement, arrived at Moldova and had a plethora of meetings with high-level officials from both Chisinau and Tiraspol. While talking in Moscow on the Transnistrian problem one month earlier, he argued that the main challenge, which could arise in Moldova in coming months, is a politicization of the settlement by the Moldovan authorities in face of coming parliamentary elections. Looking at the current situation, it can be assumed that it is exactly what is happening.
The politicization started a couple of weeks ago when Frattini’s interview for Russian channel RT was cited inaccurately by Moldovan outlets. His point was that talking about withdrawal of Russian troops and ammunitions according to the 1999 Istanbul Summit Declaration “is unrealistic until we create a comprehensive package including other issues”, also that on the special status of Transnistria. The second part of this sentence was ignored within the Moldovan public discourse; practically the situation was presented in a way that Frattini did not support the EU and US position on the withdrawal of the remnants of the former 14th Army from Moldova. The “chief coordinator of the ruling coalition” in Moldova Vlad Plahotniuc intervened personally (what is by itself an outstanding phenomenon) by saying that such a message from Frattini “may block and derail progress in the negotiations over the last years” and was made in order to get financial support from Russia for the OSCE.
During his press-conference with Cristina Lesnic, deputy prime-minister responsible for the Transnistrian settlement, Frattini reiterated his position that he sees the issue of withdrawing the Russian troops from Moldova as a part of a future comprehensive agreement which should be achieved at the final stage of the conflict settlement process. In the first place the trust should be created through confidence-building measures within “Berlin+” agenda and only after that bigger issues can be tackled, he argued. But his words were again paraphrased by the leading media outlets close to the ruling Democratic Party like Prime or Canal 2. They said that Frattini allegedly changed his position on the withdrawal of troops after he had faced harsh (predominantly official) critics from Chisinau: in their view, Frattini supports now the idea that the fastest withdrawal is necessary.
The media also cited the statement of Mrs. Lesnic who argued that Chisinau put forward another two priorities for the Italian OSCE Presidency, namely the need to closely monitor the situation in the Security Zone and the situation with the human rights on the left bank of the Dniester. To sum up, the official authorities play one and the same card of demonstrating “tough stance” in defending key national interests of Moldova against “weak” OSCE, “aggressive” Russia and “separatist leaders”, this time again with reference to the opinion of some non-governmental organizations.
In the situation with the troops’ withdrawal the official Moldovan authorities have sent in fact a message that it’s now up to the West, also Italy, to pressure Russia on this issue, and that the withdrawal should be treated as a pre-condition for the conflict settlement, not as a part of some comprehensive agreement at the final stage. The same approach was demonstrated towards the negotiations with Tiraspol. Chisinau reiterated that it is now up to the Transnistrian authorities to promote “Berlin+” agenda. Cristina Lesnic said that 87 % farmers engaged into the issue of land restitution in Transnistria filed their applications to the authorities on the left bank. The same situation with opening the bridge close to Gura Bîcului for heavy trucks: Tiraspol should not install any customs point there and principle of free movement should be kept, so Lesnic. At the same time the chief Moldovan negotiator did not mention what Chisinau should deliver, first of all in such domains as issuing car license plates for Transnistrians and providing interconnection of telecommunication spaces on both banks of the Dniester. Chisinau is returning to his time-proved strategy of blocking the negotiations by absolutizing its own demands and idea of sovereignty.
Probably Mr. Frattini needed to avoid answering questions about Russian troops in Transnistria in a way he did. Besides, from the very beginning and explicitly also during the press-conference with Lesnic he demonstrated that he awaits a quick progress in fulfilling the agreed agenda of small steps, is determined to present a package of ready-made solutions at a “5+2” meeting already in May and propose an additional confidence-building measure in form of a banking agreement between Tiraspol and Chisinau. So, he made public all his ambitions, as well as the philosophy of his approach to the issue.
Nevertheless, such politicization, promoted by the Moldovan authorities, would have happened in any case, be it during German, Austrian or Italian OSCE Presidency. The frank statements of Mr. Frattini, which he made in Moscow or Chisinau, only happened the Moldovan authorities to play their game in face of the coming elections. If he would have been too diplomatic, they could insist on his status as a friend of Putin or Lavrov, as a team-mate of Berlusconi or something like that. There are many variants in terms of “political technology”.