It is a quite hot summer in Chisinau this year. Not only due to internal political dynamic but also due to the fact that this dynamic effectively spills over into the external relations of Moldova. For instance, on July, 21, twenty five years after the “Agreement on principles of peaceful resolution of the military conflict in the Transnistrian region of Republic of Moldova” had been signed by Boris Elzin and Mircea Snegur, the Moldovan parliament adopted “The Declaration on the withdrawal of Russian military forces from the territory of the country”. The text is quite offensive towards any Russian military presence in Moldova. The Moldovan parliament not only declares that stationing of the Russian army in the Eastern part of Moldova (guarding the remnants of the former Soviet 14th Army) breaks the provisions of Moldovan constitution, in particular those about independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and permanent neutrality of the country, and the international law, but also urges the government and the president to use all means at their disposal to promote the adoption of the respective resolution of UN General Assembly on the withdrawal of Russian forces illegally stationed in Transnistria. Besides, the parliament invites mediators and observers, participating in the process of the Transnistrian conflict settlement, to initiate discussions on transforming the current peacekeeping mechanism into a civil mission under international mandate.
This document appeared unexpectedly, without having previously gone through responsible bodies of the Moldovan parliament, but it was adopted very fast, without any discussions, like the law on emending the electoral legislation a day ago. The speaker of the parliament Andrian Candu even called it the most important issue on the agenda that day. Why did the parliament pay so much attention to this issue on the last day of the parliamentary session? It seems to be that this declaration had lots of reasons to be adopted. It demonstrated how the Transnistrian (and Russian) issue can be used within Moldovan politics as a multitool out of purely tactical considerations.
Firstly, because the relations of Democratic Party of Moldova with the EU became quite tense due to the change of electoral system, which threatens to practically exclude the pro-European extraparliamentary opposition from the next successive legislature, rumors appeared that the Democratic Party could change its geopolitical orientation, play the traditional trump of “seesaw policy” and turn to Moscow. The parliamentary declaration is a good instrument to demonstrate that Moldova will not do this and to provide the necessary political grounds for all current initiatives of the Democratic Party to be accepted by the West at the end, having in mind that freezing of some installments within the 100 million Euro macrofinancial assistance package is still possible but will not change the situation fundamentally.
Secondly, the Declaration, or a negative reaction to it, is a reason for Igor Dodon to demonstrate his “harsh stance” towards the Democratic Party and its policies, both to Moscow and to internal audience. The faction of Party of Socialists left the session with a bang after the Declaration was put on the agenda. Later on Igor Dodon evaluated the parliament’s initiative as a “provocation” against Russia, which he does not support at all. But after Socialists and Democrats were so unanimous on other issues, not so much sincerity can be seen in all this game.
Thirdly, the parliamentary declaration is also addressed to some other external actors. For instance, Romania, which is explicitly favoring the withdrawal of the whole Russian military from Moldova and whose prime-minister Mihai Tudose visited Chisinau too and voiced full political support to the Moldovan authorities. Also Ukraine could be mentioned, which in the last months securitized to a very great extent the existence of Transnistria and stationing of Russian troops there and which is a close partner of Chisinau at the moment in many contexts.
Fourthly, the Transnistrian (and Russian) issue is an instrument for the ruling government to manipulate the informational space and to divide the opposition. The Declaration was adopted by the deputies not only from Democratic Party and European People’s Group, but also Liberal Party and Liberal Democratic Party, which claim to be the opposition to the current authorities. It shows very well how the geopolitical issues can be misused in Moldova under the pretense of defending “national interests” to consolidate the electorate and political class in a situation, when more urgent issues are at stake. Not to forget is also about the fact that there are many supporters of such geopolitical agenda in PAS and Platforma Civică Demnitate şi Adevăr. So it is a way of how these people can be urged to stay home and not to participate in any demos.
The adoption of some out-of-the-blue declarations with the aim to manipulate the informational space has become a routine for the current Moldovan authorities. On July, 5 it became known that the parliaments of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine allegedly signed a common statement to the European Parliament with an appeal to promote the idea of European integration for these countries in the opinion of the EU Council. Nevertheless, only Andrian Candu explicitly talked about this document, the parliaments or politicians in Ukraine and Georgia in a strange way did not mention this document afterwards. There was only a non-informative press-release on the web-site of the Georgian government on this matter. So European idea is also misused but the authorities do not seem to be very much credible in promoting this story. The protection of national interests against “separatists” and “Moscow’s hand” is a much more successful instrument.
Prohibition for Dmitry Rogozin to enter the country by reason of “uncoordinated plan of official events dedicated to 25th anniversary of the 1992 Agreement”, as well as recent expulsion of Russian diplomats were initiatives in the same direction. Actually the situation with Rogozin is telling not because it was forbidden to the Russian delegation to come by a (military?) plane but because Chisinau for the first time restricted the Russian officials from doing in Tiraspol what they envisage for themselves. The Moldovan high officials were particularly provocative in the subsequent comments. Pavel Filip argued that Rogozin could come by a regular flight or a bus. Speaker Andrian Candu said that as a citizen of Moldova he dislikes Rogozin, but that the Russian official may come to Chisinau, because it is useful in terms of diplomatic protocol and cooperation between two countries. So the aim was to be as negative as possible.
Could it be that there are any objective circumstances for Moldovan demarches beyond the tactical considerations of Democratic Party? Actually the current situation reminds of what was happening in Russian-Moldovan relations in May 2014. That time Moldovan police ransacked the plane of the Russian delegation which came to Moldova and seized the boxes with appeals of Transnistrians “to reunite with Russia”. In 2014 Russia did much to support politically Transnistria, Gagauzia and “Eurasian forces” in Chisinau, imposed some trade bans on Moldova – with the aim to act against the EU-Moldova Association Agreement. It resulted in deterioration of bilateral relations. So Moldova also responded by prohibiting Russian journalists, pro-Kremlin experts as well as the Russian military personnel going to Transnistria to enter the country.
But now the situation is different. The only one reason why the current Moldovan authorities could be angry about Moscow is that Russia has been supporting Igor Dodon by presenting him as an actor in Moldovan politics who could really normalize the bilateral relations. It gave to Party of Socialists a good chance to win the overwhelming majority in the parliament, what disturbed the logics of the Democratic Party, within which Dodon is a partner but not an equal one. Probably, the deterioration in relations with Russia is also a mean for the Democratic Party to keep the status quo in power relations with Socialists, which still remain competitive.
At the same time the situation shows that Russia does not have any instruments to effectively respond to these Moldovan demarches. Any emotional statements seem to be not productive; they even help this game in Chisinau to be fruitful. But in the long run the current situation is quite disadvantageous for Moldova as a country. Firstly, Moscow seems to have stopped the “normalization” of bilateral trade relations. Recently it became known that Moscow was going to introduce additional licensing for Moldovan transport operators. Besides, Russia seems to be quite skeptical towards the idea of opening its market for any other Moldovan companies producing wine and fruits, except those which managed to gain it due to direct support of Igor Dodon. Secondly, Transnistria seems now to be not a top priority for the Russian decision-makers, so they are unwilling to widen the financial support for the break-away republic. It can change, so the Transnistrians could get for instance the access to Russian federal subsidies for multiple-child families, what they actually have been asking for. Besides, Chisinau can now hardly await that Russia would sponsor any “reintegration” of Moldova. Last two years Moscow cooperated with the OSCE, the EU and US on promoting the agenda of “small steps policy”. Now the political basis for any substantial negotiations is disappearing.